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COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS, DESIRABILITY AND INDIFFERENCE
ARTHUR VAN CAMP, GERT DE COOMAN, ENRIQUE MIRANDA, AND ERIK QUAEGHEBEUR
ABSTRACT. We investigate how to model indifference with choice functions. We take the
coherence axioms for choice functions proposed by Seidenfeld, Schervisch and Kadane as a
source of inspiration, but modify them to strengthen the connection with desirability. We
discuss the properties of choice functions that are coherent under our modified set of axioms
and the connection with desirability. Once this is in place, we present an axiomatisation of
indifference in terms of desirability. On this we build our definition of indifference in terms
of choice functions, which we discuss in some detail.
1. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental problem of study in decision theory is how to make a choice from
within a set of available options. Rubin [21] proposed a theory of choice functions based on
choices between more than two elements, where an agent determines which are the optimal
ones for any input set. He started from von Neumann and Morgenstern’s [33] axiomatisation
of choices based on pairwise comparisons between the options.
One aspect of Rubin’s axiomatisation is that the agent is assumed to be able to make
a comparison between any pair of options (either one of them is strictly preferred to the
other or they are indifferent). As a consequence, he is assumed to be indifferent between
any two options chosen from a given set. However, the agent may be undecided between
two options without being indifferent between them, particularly when the information
available does not allow for a complete comparison of the options; this will for instance
typically be the case when there is no relevant information available at all. This is one of
the motivations for a theory of imprecise probabilities [34], where incomparability and
indifference are distinguished. This point was also discussed by Kadane et al. [16] (and
also [27]), who generalised Rubin’s axioms [21] in order to allow for incomparability. One
interesting aspect of their take on choice functions is that it does not require any predefined
utility.
Imprecise probability is an umbrella term for mathematical models that are meant to be
used in situations of imprecise or incomplete information, where it may not be possible
(or advisable) to use (precise) probabilities. In particular, it covers sets of probability
measures and various types of non-additive measures and functionals, such as coherent
lower previsions, belief functions and possibility measures. All of these models can be
expressed in terms of coherent sets of desirable gambles [19, 34, 35], which encode the
gambles that a subject, whose beliefs we want to model, strictly prefers to the status quo. One
of their advantages is that they avoid problems with conditioning on events of probability
zero. They can be—and have been—used to replace probabilities in Bayesian networks, for
predictive inference, and so on [5, 7, 11, 13, 18].
Sets of desirable gambles are typically a binary concept: they are characterised by
pairwise comparisons between the available options, whereas in practice choice may be
more complex. Choice functions based on binary comparisons only may represent behaviour
that is considered to be paradoxical by some [3, 14, 22]. One of the aims of this paper is to
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study how the more general—not necessarily binary—choice functions relate to the sets of
desirable gambles that are now more commonly used in imprecise probabilities papers.
In order to establish such a relationship, we must pay some attention at this point to
the options that subjects choose between on both approaches: gambles on the desirability
approach, and horse lotteries in a choice function context. A detailed discussion of this
issue can be found in a recent paper by Zaffalon and Miranda [36], but for our present
purposes it suffices to mention that choosing between gambles essentially amounts to
choosing between horse lotteries with only two rewards—say, winning a prize and not
winning it—and the value of a gamble is essentially proportional to the probability of
winning the prize on the corresponding horse lottery approach. This correspondence makes
it relatively straightforward to translate the axioms proposed by Seidenfeld et al. [27]
for choice functions on horse lotteries into their counterparts for gambles: we prefer to
work with gambles here because that makes it easier to see the link with sets of desirable
gambles. We will find it expedient to drop two particular axioms from the theory proposed
by Seidenfeld et al. [27], thus making our coherence notion less restrictive. The first one is
the Archimedean axiom, which is not fully compatible with the theory of coherent sets of
desirable gambles—indeed it is letting go of Archimedean continuity that allows coherent
sets of desirable gambles to avoid the problems that arise when conditioning on sets of
probability zero. We have also not included the convexity axiom of Seidenfeld et al. [27],
since it is incompatible with Walley–Sen maximality [30, 34], the optimality criterion
typically associated with sets of desirable gambles. We discuss the axioms for our coherent
choice functions and their main properties in Section 2.
In Section 3, we show that models of coherent sets of desirable gambles can be embedded
within our theory of coherent choice functions, and we study the specific properties of
choice functions that can be related to desirability. This exploratory work culminates in
Section 4, where we focus on sets of probability measures and collections of maximal
coherent sets of desirable gambles.
Once the connection between choice functions and desirability is in place, we move—in
Section 5—to a definition and closer investigation of the property of indifference be-
tween two options. This is a crucial step towards enabling uncertainty models to represent
symmetry [9]. For example, when modelling exchangeability and proving de Finetti-type
representation theorems, an appropriate notion of indifference is essential. For choice func-
tions, indifference was introduced by Seidenfeld [24], and for sets of desirable gambles by
de Cooman and Quaeghebeur [11].
The connection between choice functions and sets of desirable gambles established
in Section 3 leads us to investigate how to model choice that is compatible with a set of
indifference assessments. Our approach to defining indifference focuses on the quotient
space induced by the indifference relation. This allows us to exploit notions and techniques
from linear algebra to deal with it mathematically. It also enables us to prove a representation
result that makes it easy to consider conservative inference under indifference. We show
how our notion is related to the one established by Seidenfeld [24].
We conclude the paper with some additional discussion in Section 6. In order not to
impede the main flow of the argumentation, we have moved all proofs to an appendix.
2. CHOICE FUNCTIONS ON OPTION SETS
Consider a real vector space V, provided with the vector addition + and scalar multi-
plication. We denote by 0 the additive identity, or null vector. For any subsets O1 and O2
of V and any λ in R, we define λO1 ∶= {λu ∶ u ∈O1} and O1+O2 ∶= {u+v ∶ u ∈O1,v ∈O2}.
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Elements u of V are intended as abstract representations of options amongst which a subject
can express his preferences, by specifying, as we will see below, choice functions. Mostly,
options will be real-valued maps on the possibility space, interpreted as uncertain rewards,
and therefore also called gambles. Our reason for working with the more abstract notion
of options—elements of some general vector space—is that in Section 5, we will need
choice functions defined on equivalence classes of options. These equivalence classes again
constitute a vector space—and hence are abstract options themselves—but they can no
longer be interpreted easily and directly as gambles. Another reason for using options more
general than gambles is that recent work [36] has shown that a very general theory of binary
preference can be constructed using vector-valued gambles. These are no longer gambles in
the above-mentioned sense, but still constitute a linear space.
We denote by Q(V) the set of all non-empty finite subsets of V, a strict subset of the
power set of V. Elements O ofQ(V) are the option sets amongst which a subject can choose
his preferred options. When it is clear what vector space of options we are talking about, we
will omit explicit mention of V and simply write Q.
Definition 1. A choice function C on Q is a map
C∶Q→Q∪{∅}∶O↦C(O) such that C(O) ⊆O.
We collect all choice functions in the set C.
The idea underlying this definition is that a choice function C selects the set C(O) of ‘best’
options in the option set O, or, on another interpretation, the ones that cannot be rejected.
Our definition resembles the one commonly used in the literature [1, 27, 29], except for a
restriction to finite option sets, which, then again, is also not altogether unusual [15, 23, 28].
2.1. An equivalent representation. An equivalent notion of a choice function is that of a
binary relation—called choice relation—on Q.
Definition 2. A choice relation ⊲ is a binary relation on Q that satisfies the following two
properties for all O, O1 and O2 in Q:
(i) if O2∖O1 ⊆O ⊆O1∪O2 then O1 ⊲ O2⇔O1 ⊲ O;
(ii) if O1∪O2 ⊆O then (O1 ⊲ O and O2 ⊲ O)⇔O1∪O2 ⊲ O.
We collect all choice relations in the set S.
Given a choice function, we can use it to define a choice relation, and vice versa:
Definition 3. Given a choice function C, define the corresponding binary relation ⊲C as
O1 ⊲C O2⇔C(O1∪O2) ⊆O2∖O1⇔C(O1∪O2)∩O1 =∅ for all O1 and O2 in Q.
Conversely, given a choice relation ⊲, define the corresponding function C⊲ as
C⊲(O) ∶=⋂{O′ ⊆O ∶O∖O′ ⊲ O} =O∖⋃{O′ ⊆O ∶O′ ⊲ O} for all O in Q.
The interpretation is clear: we find that O1 ⊲C O2 if u ∉C(O1∪O2) for all u in O1—in
other words, when every option from O1 is not chosen—rejected—when presented with
O1∪O2 as option set. Furthermore, for C⊲, an option u is rejected from O—meaning that
u ∈O and u ∉C⊲(O)—if there is some O′ ⊆O for which u ∈O′ and O′ ⊲ O—in other words,
if there is some O′ that contains u and such that O is preferred to O′.
Starting from a choice relation ⊲, it is clear from Definition 3 that C⊲ is a choice
function—meaning that C⊲(O) ⊆O for all O in Q. We prove the converse argument—that
⊲C satisfies the two properties of Definition 2—in the following proposition:
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Proposition 1. Given a choice function C, the corresponding binary relation ⊲C is a choice
relation.
Interestingly, we can use C and ⊲ interchangeably:
Proposition 2. Given any choice function C, we have C⊲C =C. Similarly, given any choice
relation ⊲, we have ⊲C⊲=⊲. As a consequence, ⊲C=⊲⇔C⊲ =C for all C in C and ⊲ in S.
2.2. Rationality axioms. Seidenfeld et al. [27, Section 3] call a choice function C coherent
if there is a non-empty set of probability-utility pairs S such that C(O) is the set of options in
O that maximise expected utility for some element of S . They also provide an axiomatisation
for this type of coherence, based on the one for binary preferences [2]. One of their axioms is
an ‘Archimedean’ continuity condition, and another one is a convexity condition, necessary
for the connection with a set of probability-utility pairs.
We prefer to define coherence directly in terms of axioms, without reference to probabili-
ties and utilities. In such a context, we see no compelling reason to adopt an Archimedean
axiom, all the more so because we are interested in establishing the connection between
choice functions and Walley’s [35] sets of desirable gambles, which need not satisfy this
axiom. Furthermore, the convexity condition does not generally allow for choice functions
that select the undominated options under some partial ordering, which is something we
find natural, and will need later on.
For these reasons, we propose an alternative—and in some sense weaker—axiomatisation
in Section 2.2.2 by dropping the Archimedean condition and the convexity condition of
Seidenfeld et al. [27]. Then again, our second axiom is a slightly strengthened version of
theirs, needed for the conditioning we intend to discuss in a later paper.
2.2.1. Some useful definitions. We call N the set of all (strictly positive) integers, and
N0 ∶=N∪{0}. Also, we call R>0 the set of all (strictly) positive real numbers, and R≥0 ∶=
R>0∪{0}.
Given any subset O of V, we define the linear hull span(O) as the set of all finite linear





λkuk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R,uk ∈O} ⊆ V,






λkuk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R>0,uk ∈O} ⊆ span(O),









αk = 1,uk ∈O} ⊆ posi(O).
A subset O of V is called a convex cone if it is closed under positive finite linear combinations,
i.e. if posi(O) =O. A convex cone K is called proper if K∩−K = {0}.
With any proper convex cone K ⊆ V, we associate an ordering ⪯K on V, defined for all u
and v in V as follows:
u ⪯K v⇔ v−u ∈K⇔ 0 ⪯K v−u⇔ u−v ⪯K 0.
We also write u ⪰K v for v ⪯K u. The ordering ⪯K is actually a vector ordering: it is a
partial order—reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive—that satisfies the following two
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characteristic properties:
u1 ⪯K u2⇔ u1+v ⪯K u2+v; (1)
u1 ⪯K u2⇔ λu1 ⪯K λu2, (2)
for all u1,u2,v in V and λ in R>0. Conversely, given any vector ordering ⪯, the proper
convex cone K from which it is derived can always be retrieved by K = {u ∈ V ∶ u ⪰ 0}.
When the abstract options are gambles, ⪯ will typically be the pointwise order. When the
options are equivalence classes, as in Section 5.2, the ordering will be typically the induced
ordering on equivalence classes, defined in Equation (13) further on.
The vector space of options V, ordered by the vector ordering ⪯K, is called an ordered
vector space ⟨V,⪯K⟩. We will refrain from explicitly mentioning the actual proper convex
cone K we are using, and simply write V to mean the ordered vector space, and use ⪯ for
the associated vector ordering.
Finally, with any vector ordering ⪯, we associate the strict partial ordering ≺ as follows:
u ≺ v⇔ (u ⪯ v and u ≠ v)⇔ v−u ∈K∖{0} for all u,v in V.
We call u positive if u ≻ 0, and collect all positive options in the convex cone V≻0 ∶=K∖{0}.
At this point, it is important to mention that from here on, we assume the cone K to be
fixed and given. It serves to identify a ‘positive orthant’ V≻0 =K∖{0}, and should not be
confused with the sets of desirable options (defined further on in Section 3.1), which are
cones as well, and typically include the positive orthant V≻0.
2.2.2. Rationality axioms for choice functions.
Definition 4. We call a choice function C on Q(V) coherent if for all O,O1,O2 in Q, all
u,v in V and all λ in R>0:
C1. C(O) ≠∅;
C2. if u ≺ v then {v} =C({u,v});
C3. a. if C(O2) ⊆O2∖O1 and O1 ⊆O2 ⊆O then C(O) ⊆O∖O1;
b. if C(O2) ⊆O1 and O ⊆O2∖O1 then C(O2∖O) ⊆O1;
C4. a. if O1 ⊆C(O2) then λO1 ⊆C(λO2);
b. if O1 ⊆C(O2) then O1+{u} ⊆C(O2+{u}).
We collect all coherent choice functions on V in the set C̄.
Remark that Axiom C3b is well defined, in the sense that none of C’s arguments there
can be empty. Indeed, O2∖O is guaranteed to be non-empty: since O ⊆ O2∖O1, we find
that O2∖O must include the set O1, which is non-empty by Axiom C1 into account.
Parts C3a and C3b of Axiom C3 are respectively known as Sen’s condition α and
Aizerman’s condition. They are more commonly written as, respectively:
(O1∩C(O2) =∅ and O1 ⊆O2 ⊆O)⇒O1∩C(O) =∅ for all O,O1,O2 in Q, (3)
and
(O1∩C(O2) =∅ and O ⊆O1)⇒O1∩C(O2∖O) =∅ for all O,O1,O2 in Q. (4)
The first one means that any option that is rejected in a option set O2 must also be rejected
in any larger option set O (i.e., the inclusion of new options in the set cannot make an option
that was rejected to become acceptable), while the second one means that if we reject an
option in O2 we should also reject it when we remove some options that are also rejected
from the option set (i.e., the removal of rejected options does not alter the judgments about
the remaining ones).
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The following proposition collects a number of immediate properties of coherent choice
functions.
Proposition 3. The following statements hold for any coherent choice function C:
(i) λC(O)+{u} =C(λO+{u}) for all O in Q, λ in R>0 and u in V;
(ii) for all u1,u2 in V such that u1 ⪯ u2, all O in Q and all v in O∖{u1,u2}:
a. if u2 ∈O and v ∉C(O∪{u1}) then v ∉C(O);
b. if u1 ∈O and v ∉C(O) then v ∉C({u2}∪O∖{u1});
(iii) C is insensitive to the omission of non-chosen options [12, Definition 11]: C(O′) =
C(O) for all O,O′ in Q such that C(O) ⊆O′ ⊆O;
(iv) C(C(O)) =C(O) for all O in Q.
As already announced and motivated earlier, our axioms in Definition 4 are a subset of
the ones considered by Seidenfeld et al. [27], who use horse lotteries as the basic options
a subject must choose between. The set of all horse lotteries plays a similar role there as
our vector space of options V does here. We omit two of Seidenfeld et al.’s [27] axioms:
the Archimedean axiom, ensuring some continuity of coherent choice functions, and a
convexity axiom. However, in further work we do intend to study the implications of adding
the convexity axiom in the context of the relation between choice functions and sets of
desirable options.
Our Axiom C2 is a slightly strengthened version of one of Seidenfeld et al.’s [27] axioms.
To compensate for this slightly weaker requirement, they impose the two properties (ii)a
and (ii)b of our Proposition 3 as separate rationality axioms [27, Axiom 4]. Our proofs
for them rely quite heavily on, amongst other things, our slightly stronger Axiom C2. Our
reason for using this strengthened version is that we want to concentrate on the relationship
with desirability: any choice function that does not satisfy Axiom C2 does not induce a
coherent set of desirable gambles, as we will see in Section 3.3.
Seidenfeld et al.’s [27] call a choice function C, defined on the set Q(H) of all finite
subsets of the setH of all horse lotteries, coherent if
C∗1 . C(O) ≠∅ for all O in Q(H) ;
C∗2 . for all O in Q(H) and H, H1 and H2 inH such that H ∉ {H1,H2} and H1 ⪯H2:
a. if H2 ∈O and H ∉C({H1}∪O) then H ∉C(O);
b. if H1 ∈O and H ∉C(O) then H ∉C({H2}∪O∖{H1});
C∗3 . for all O, O1 and O2 in Q(H):
a. if C(O2) ⊆O2∖O1 and O1 ⊆O2 ⊆O then C(O) ⊆O∖O1;
b. if C(O2) ⊆O1 and O ⊆O2∖O1 then C(O2∖O) ⊆O1;
C∗4 . O1 ⊲C O2⇔ (αO1+(1−α){H}) ⊲C (αO2+(1−α){H}), for all O1 and O2 inQ(H)
and H inH;
C∗5 . if O ⊆O1 ⊆CH(O) then C(O) ⊆C(O1), for all O and O1 in Q(H);
C∗6 . for all O, O
′, O′′ in Q(H) and all sequences Oi′ and Oi′′ in Q(H) such that Oi′
converges point-wise to O′ and Oi′′ converges point-wise to O′′ (for i in N):
a. if (∀i ∈N)Oi′′ ⊲C Oi′ and O′ ⊲C O then O′′ ⊲C O;
b. if (∀i ∈N)Oi′′ ⊲C Oi′ and O ⊲C O′′ then O ⊲C O′′;
where ⪯ is some predetermined reflexive order onH.
Seidenfeld et al.’s [27] choice functions are defined on horse lotteries while we define
our choice functions on any linear space, so direct comparison is not immediate. But there
is a very close formal resemblance between the two sets of axioms. Indeed, Axioms C1
and C∗1 correspond; so do Axioms C3 and C
∗
3 ; and—perhaps less obviously—Axioms C4
and C∗4 . Axiom C
∗
2 , being a dominance condition, is essentially Proposition 3(ii), and can be
regarded as a weaker counterpart of Axiom C2. In the present setting, we are not interested
COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS, DESIRABILITY AND INDIFFERENCE 7
in Axiom C∗5 because it is in general not compatible with maximality as a decision rule;
neither are we interested in Axiom C∗6 because it is a continuity requirement that is not fully
compatible with sets of desirable gambles.
2.2.3. Rationality axioms for choice relations. It turns out we can formulate the rationality
axioms for choice functions—Definition 4—directly in terms of choice relations.
Definition 5. We call a choice relation ⊲ on Q(V) coherent if for all O,O1,O2 in Q, all u
in V and all λ in R>0:
S1. O ⋪ O;
S2. if u ≺ v then {u} ⊲ {v};
S3. a. if O1 ⊲ O2 and O2 ⊆O then O1 ⊲ O;
b. if O1 ⊲ O2 and O ⊂O1 then O1∖O ⊲ O2∖O;
S4. a. if O1 ⊲ O2 then λO1 ⊲ λO2;
b. if O1 ⊲ O2 then O1+{u} ⊲ O2+{u}.
We collect all coherent choice relations on V in the set S̄ .
The following proposition collects a number of immediate properties of coherent choice
relations.1
Proposition 4. The following statements hold for any coherent choice relation ⊲:
(i) ⊲ is a strict partial order: it is irreflexive and transitive;
(ii) for all O1 and O2 in Q, all u in V and λ in R>0: O1 ⊲ O2⇔ λO1+{u} ⊲ λO2+{u}.
The rationality axioms of Definitions 4 and 5 correspond:
Proposition 5. Given any coherent choice function C, ⊲C is a coherent choice relation.
Conversely, given any coherent choice relation ⊲, C⊲ is a coherent choice function.
2.3. The ‘is not more informative than’ relation. Because we are interested in conser-
vative reasoning with choice functions, we want to look for those implications of a given
assessment that are as ‘uninformative’ as possible. To this end, we need to introduce some
binary relation ⊑ on the set C of all choice functions, having the specific interpretation of
‘not more informative than’, or, in other words, ‘at least as uninformative as’.
Definition 6. Given two choice functions C1 and C2 in C, we call C1 not more informative
than C2—and we write C1 ⊑C2—if (∀O ∈Q)C1(O) ⊇C2(O).
This intuitive way of ordering choice functions is also used by Bradley [4] and Van Camp
et al. [31]. The underlying idea is that a choice function is more informative when it con-
sistently chooses more specifically—or more restrictively—amongst the available options.
The corresponding notion for choice relations is as follows: given two choice relations ⊲1
and ⊲2, ⊲1 is not more informative than ⊲2—we write ⊲1⊑S⊲2—if ⊲1⊆⊲2. That is, choice
relation ⊲2 is at least as informative as ⊲1 when every comparison made by ⊲1 is also made
by ⊲2.
Since, by definition, ⊑ is a product ordering of set inclusions, the following result is
immediate [6].
Proposition 6. The structure (C;⊑) is a complete lattice:
(i) it is a partially ordered set, or poset, meaning that the binary relation ⊑ on C is
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive;
1See [16] for a similar result.
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(ii) for any subset C′ of C, its infimum infC′ and its supremum supC′ with respect to
the ordering ⊑ exist in C, and are given by infC′(O) =⋃C∈C′C(O) and supC′(O) =
⋂C∈C′C(O) for all O in Q.
Moreover, (S;⊑S) is a complete lattice as well.
The idea underlying these notions of infimum and supremum is that infC′ is the most
informative model that is not more informative than any of the models in C′, and supC′ the
least informative model that is not less informative than any of the models in C′.
We will also consider the poset (C̄;⊑) of all coherent choice functions, where C̄ ⊆ C
inherits the partial order ⊑ from C. Similarly, in the poset (S̄;⊑S) of all coherent choice
relations, S̄ is assumed to inherit the partial order ⊑S from S .
Also from an order-theoretic point of view, choice functions or choice relations are
equivalent:
Proposition 7. The posets (C;⊑) and (S;⊑S) are order isomorphic [6]: there is a map
f from C to S such that C1 ⊑ C2⇔ f (C1) ⊑S f (C2) for all C1 and C2 in C. Moreover, the
posets (C̄;⊑) and (S̄;⊑S) are order isomorphic as well.
This proposition implies that we can regard ⊑ and ⊑S essentially as the same partial orders,
each defined on their respective domains, in the sense that each of the partial orders can be
obtained from the other one just by renaming. Therefore, from now on, we will identify ⊑S
with ⊑, and only use the latter.
Proposition 8. (C̄;⊑) is a complete infimum-semilattice: C̄ is closed under arbitrary non-
empty infima, so infC′ ∈ C̄ for any non-empty subset C′ of C̄.
As a result of Proposition 7, (S̄;⊑) is a complete infimum-semilattice as well.
This, for instance, allows us to do conservative inference with choice functions: if we
consider that there is a coherent choice function that represents a subject’s beliefs (coherent
choices) and we can only tell that it belongs to a family {Ci ∶ i ∈ I}, the conservative option
is to consider its infimum infi∈I Ci. This choice function is still guaranteed to be coherent,
and as a consequence, it satisfies all the rationality requirements discussed above.
As we will show in Proposition 14 further on, there is a least informative coherent choice
function, namely the infimum of all coherent choice functions: it is given by C(O) = {u ∈
O ∶ (∀v ∈O)u⊀ v} for all O in Q.
3. THE RELATION WITH SETS OF DESIRABLE OPTIONS
In general, a choice function cannot be characterised using only pairwise comparisons of
options, meaning that a binary relation on options does not uniquely determine a choice
function. In this section, we study a special class of choice functions that are determined by
their restrictions to option sets of cardinality two.
3.1. Sets of desirable options. Sets of desirable options are a(n obvious and immediate)
generalisation of sets of desirable gambles. Gambles are real-valued maps on a possibility
space X , interpreted as uncertain rewards. They can be seen as vectors in the vector space
RX . Here we generalise this notion by looking at a general (abstract) vector space V
of (abstract) options, rather than gambles, provided with a vector ordering ⪯; see also
Section 2.2.1. We will see that sets of desirable options amount to a pairwise comparison of
options and therefore correspond to a special kind of choice functions.
A set of desirable options D is simply a subset of the vector space of options V—its
interpretation will be that it contains those options that some subject strictly prefers to the
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status quo 0. We collect all possible such sets of desirable options in the set D. As we did
for choice functions, we pay special attention to coherent sets of desirable options. The
following is an immediate generalisation of existing coherence definitions [7, 10, 11, 19]
from gambles to abstract options.




D3. if u ∈D then λu ∈D;
D4. if u,v ∈D then u+v ∈D.
We let D̄ denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable options.
Axioms D3 and D4 turn coherent sets of desirable options D into convex cones—meaning
that posi(D) = D. They include the positive options due to Axiom D2, but not the zero
option due to Axiom D1. As an immediate consequence, their intersection with V≺0 ∶= −V≻0
is empty. As usual, we may associate with the convex cone D a strict partial order ½—
called preference relation—on V, by letting u ½ v⇔ 0 ½ v− u⇔ v− u ∈ D, leading to
D = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ½ u} [11, 19]. The connection between this order and the one associated to
choice functions will be clarified in Section 3.3.
3.2. The ‘is not more informative than’ relation. Sets of desirable options can be ordered
according to a ‘not more informative than’ relation, analogously to the ordering introduced
for choice functions.
Definition 8. Given two sets of desirable options D1,D2 in D, we call D1 not more infor-
mative than D2 when D1 ⊆D2.
Because the ordering of sets of desirable options ⊆ is just set inclusion, it is a partial
ordering on D, and the poset (D;⊆) is a complete lattice, with supremum operator ⋃, and
infimum operator ⋂. Next we investigate the structure of the set of all coherent sets of
desirable options:
Proposition 9. (D̄;⊆) is a complete infimum-semilattice, or alternatively, D̄ is an inter-
section structure—closed under arbitrary non-empty intersections. The least informative
(smallest) set of desirable options Dv is given by Dv ∶= V≻0.
We will refer to Dv as the vacuous set of desirable options.
It will be useful to also consider the maximally informative, or maximal, coherent sets of
desirable options.2 They are the undominated elements of the complete infimum-semilattice
(D̄;⊆); we collect them into a set D̂:
D̂ ∶= {D ∈ D̄ ∶ (∀D′ ∈ D̄)(D ⊆D′⇒D =D′)}.
First, we prove a useful proposition that will allow us to characterise these maximal
elements very elegantly.
Proposition 10. Given any coherent set of desirable options D and any non-zero option
u ∉D, posi(D∪{−u}) is a coherent set of desirable options. As a consequence, a coherent
set of desirable options D is maximal if and only if
(∀u ∈ V∖{0})(u ∈D or −u ∈D). (5)
2The discussion in the rest of this section is based on similar discussions about sets of desirable gambles
[5, 11, 20]. We repeat the details here mutatis mutandis to make the paper more self-contained.
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Next we show that the set of all coherent sets of desirable options is dually atomic,
meaning that any coherent set of desirable options is the infimum of its non-empty set of
dominating maximal coherent sets of desirable options:
Proposition 11. For any coherent set of desirable options D, its set of dominating maximal
coherent sets of desirable options D̂D ∶= {D̂ ∈ D̂ ∶D ⊆ D̂} is non-empty. Moreover, D = infD̂D .
3.3. Connection between choice functions and sets of desirable options. We now set
out to establish a connection between choice functions and sets of desirable options.
Definition 9. Given a choice function C, we say that an option v is chosen over some
option u whenever u ∉C({u,v}), or equivalently, whenever {u} ⊲C {v}. Similarly, given a
set of desirable options D, we say that an option v is preferred to some option u whenever
v−u ∈D, or equivalently, u ½ v. We call a choice function C and a set of desirable options D
compatible when
u ∉C({u,v})⇔ v−u ∈D⇔ u ½ v for all u,v ∈ V.
Compatibility means that the behaviour of the choice function restricted to pairs of options
reflects the behaviour of the set of desirable options.3 So, a choice function C will have at
most one compatible set of desirable options, whereas conversely, a set of desirable options
D may have many compatible choice functions: compatibility only directly influences the
behaviour of a choice function on pairs.
The definition of compatibility with desirability is clearer in terms of the relations:
a choice relation ⊲ is compatible with some preference relation ½ if {u} ⊲ {v}⇔ u ½ v
for all u and v in Q. Loosely speaking, ⊲ and ½ are compatible if ⊲ lifts ½ from options
to sets of options. This observation also sheds light on the necessity of our Axiom C2,
which Seidenfeld et al. [27] use a weakened version of. Indeed, if a choice relation does not
satisfy Axiom C2 then necessarily 0 /½ u for some 0 ≺ u, contradicting Axiom D2.
3.3.1. From choice functions to desirability. We begin by studying the properties of the set
of desirable options compatible with a given coherent choice function. Since compatibility
is related to the restriction of the choice function to pairwise comparison, it is not surprising
that each choice function has a unique compatible set of desirable options:
Proposition 12. For any coherent choice function C in C̄, the unique compatible coherent
set of desirable options DC is given by DC ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∉C({0,u})} = {u ∈ V ∶ {0} ⊲C {u}}.
Example 1. Consider V =R2, and let us denote the two components of any vector u in R2
by u1 and u1, so u = (u1,u2). Let C be the choice function given by
C(O) ∶= {u ∈O ∶ there is no v ∈O such that v1+v2 > u1+u2}. (6)
It is easy to check that C is a coherent choice function—it is an example of what we will
call an E-admissible choice function later. And
DC = {u ∈ V ∶ u1+u2 > 0} (7)
is its associated coherent set of desirable options. 
3See Seidenfeld et al. [25] for an axiomatisation of imprecise preferences in the context of binary comparisons
of horse lotteries, rather than gambles.
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3.3.2. From desirability to choice functions. We collect in C̄D all the coherent choice
functions that are compatible with a given coherent set of desirable options D:
C̄D ∶={C ∈ C̄ ∶ (∀u,v ∈ V)(v ∉C({u,v})⇔ u−v ∈D)}
={C ∈ C̄ ∶DC =D}.
The correspondence between choice functions and sets of desirable options can be many-
to-one, in the sense that several different coherent choice functions may be compatible
with the same coherent set of desirable options. An important role is played by the most
uninformative of them:
Proposition 13. Given a coherent set of desirable options D, the infimum—most uninfor-
mative element—inf C̄D of its set of compatible coherent choice functions C̄D is the coherent
choice function CD , defined by
CD(O) ∶={u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉D}
={u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)u /½ v} for all O in Q. (8)
The coherent choice function CD is the least informative choice function that is compatible
with a coherent set of desirable options D: it is based on the binary ordering represented
by D and nothing else. As we will see in Proposition 19, there typically are other coherent
choice functions C compatible with D, but they encode more information than just the
binary ordering represented by D. Proposition 13 is especially interesting because it shows
that the most conservative choice function based on a strict partial order of options, is the
choice function based on maximality4 —the one that selects the undominated options under
the strict partial order ½ associated with a coherent set of desirable options D. Any choice
function that is based on maximality under such a strict partial order is coherent.
Proposition 13 can also be interpreted in terms of choice relations: given a coherent set of
desirable gambles D—or a coherent preference relation ½—, the most uninformative choice
relation ⊲D that is compatible with it, is by Proposition 7 equal to ⊲CD , and determined by
O1 ⊲D O2⇔ (∀u ∈O1)(∃v ∈O2)u ½ v, for all O1 and O2 in Q.
This shows that the partial order ⊲D is simply the result of lifting ½ from elements to sets.
Example 2. Let D be the coherent set of desirable options given by Equation (7). Its
associated coherent choice function CD is given by
C(O) ∶= {u ∈O ∶ there is no v ∈O such that v1+v2 > u1+u2},
so it coincides with the choice function given by Equation (6). 
Although in this particular example the two procedures coincide, there is in general more
than one coherent choice function that is compatible with a coherent set of desirable options.
In other words, a coherent choice function is not uniquely determined by its restriction to
binary comparisons; we will give an example in Example 6 further on.
Proposition 8 guarantees that there is a unique smallest—least informative—coherent
choice function. We will call it the vacuous choice function, and denote it by Cv.
Proposition 14. The vacuous choice function Cv is given by Cv(O) =CDv(O) = {u ∈ O ∶
(∀v ∈O)u⊀ v} for all O inQ. It selects from any set of options the ones that are undominated
under the strict vector ordering ≺.
4Note that maximility here refers to the optimality decision criterion [30, 34], and it does not mean that the set
of desirable options D is a maximal one, in the sense considered in Section 3.2.
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Similarly, the vacuous choice relation ⊲v is equal to ⊲Cv by Proposition 7, and is deter-
mined by O1 ⊲v O2⇔ (∀u ∈O1)(∃v ∈O2)u ≺ v for all O1 and O2 in Q.
Example 3. Consider, as a simple example, the case that the vector ordering is total,
meaning that for any u,v in V, either u ≺ v, v ≺ u or u = v. It then follows from Proposition 14
that, for any coherent choice function C, C(O) ⊆Cv(O) =maxO for all O ∈Q, where maxO
is the unique largest element of the finite option set O according to the strict total ordering ≺.
But then Axiom C1 guarantees that C(O) =Cv(O) =maxO for all O ∈Q, so Cv is the only
coherent choice function. 
3.3.3. Properties of the relation between choice functions and desirability. Since sets
of desirable options represent only pairwise comparison, and are therefore generally less
expressive than choice functions, we expect that going from a choice function to a compatible
set of desirable options leads to a loss of information, whereas going the opposite route does
not. This is confirmed by Propositions 15 and 16, and in particular by their Corollary 17.
Proposition 15. Consider any set of coherent choice functions C′ ⊆ C̄. Then DinfC′ = inf{DC ∶
C ∈ C′} and Cinf{DC ∶C∈C′} ⊑ infC
′, and therefore also CDinfC′ ⊑ infC
′.
Definition 10. For any set of coherent sets of desirable options D′ ⊆ D̄, we define the
‘infimum of maximality’ choice function as CD′ ∶= inf{CD ∶D ∈D′}.
Proposition 16. Consider any set of coherent sets of desirable options D′ ⊆ D̄. Then
DCD′ = infD
′. Moreover, CinfD′ ⊑CD′ .
This result also helps to highlight that coherent choice functions are indeed more in-
formative than coherent sets of desirable options, in the sense that two different coherent
choice functions (CinfD′ and CD′ ) may determine the same coherent set of desirable options
(infD′) when restricted to option sets of cardinality two. Thus, we need to move to this
richer model in order to fully represent the beliefs encompassed by {CD ∶D ∈D′}. Moreover,
this happens even if each of the choice functions in the set D′ is fully determined by a
coherent set of desirable options.
From these two results we immediately deduce the following:
Corollary 17. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D ∈ D̄ and any coherent
choice function C ∈ C̄. Then D =DCD and CDC ⊑C.
If we consider the maps
D●∶D→ C∶D↦CD as defined by Proposition 12
C●∶C →D∶C↦DC as defined in Equation (8),
then Corollary 17 essentially states that D● ○C● = id, the identity map, while (C● ○D●)(C) ⊑
C for all C in C̄. This observation helps us interpret Propositions 15 and 16 using the
commuting diagrams for Proposition 15:
C
′ infC′
{DC ∶C ∈ C
′
} inf{DC ∶C ∈ C
′




and for Proposition 16:
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Full lines indicate the maps (D●, C● or inf), while dashed lines indicate an “is not more
informative than” (⊑ for choice functions, ⊆ for sets of desirable gambles) relation.
Example 5 in Section 4 further on will show that the inequalities in these results can be
strict; this does not seem surprising for the inequality of Proposition 15, but is perhaps less
intuitively obvious for the one in Proposition 16.
4. OTHER TYPES OF COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Given a coherent set of desirable options, we can define a coherent choice function by
selecting undominated elements as in Equation (8). However, these are not the only possible
coherent choice functions: for instance, any infimum of such coherent choice functions is
still coherent.
Proposition 18. Consider any set of coherent sets of desirable options D′ ⊆ D̄, then CD′ is
a coherent choice function.
This proposition gives a procedure to define coherent choice functions complying with a
sensitivity analysis interpretation, where the underlying uncertainty model is that of coherent
sets of desirable options: we may consider a set D′ of possible models and then the set
of coherent choice functions they determine; by taking the infimum of this set we end up
choosing those options that are considered acceptable by at least one of the possible models.
Example 4. Consider again V =R2, and let D1,D2 the coherent sets of desirable options
given by
D1 = {u ∈R2 ∶ u(x)+u(y) > 0} and D2 = {u ∈R2 ∶ 2u(x)+u(y) > 0}.
Then the choice function C = inf{CD1 ,CD2} is coherent. If we consider for instance the
option set O = {(4,−4),(2,−1),(0,0),(−1,2)}, we obtain
C(O) = inf{CD1(O),CD2(O)} = {(2,−1),(−1,2),(4,−4)}.
The first two options are elements of CD1(O) and the last one is an element of CD2(O). 
As special cases, we may consider ‘infimum of maximality’ choice functions where
some additional condition is imposed on the coherent sets of desirable options. We will
investigate two such situations in this section, although other are possible. In Definition 11,
we focus only on sets of maximal coherent sets of desirable options, that we introduced
in Section 3.2. Their interest lies in the fact that they are related to mass functions, as we
discussed quite thoroughly in [5, 11, 20] in the context of gambles.
Definition 11. If D′ ⊆ D̂ is a set of maximal coherent set of desirable options, the coherent
choice function CD′ is called M-admissible. We will also denote it by CMD′ as a reminder
that the infimum is taken over maximal sets.
In particular, we can consider the M-admissible choice functions for the set D′ = D̂D of all
maximal coherent set of desirable options that include a coherent set of desirable options D.
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In order not to overburden the notation, we let
CMD ∶=CMD̂D = inf{CD̂ ∶ D̂ ∈ D̂ and D ⊆ D̂}, (9)
and similarly to what we did before, we introduce the map
CM● ∶D′→ C′∶D↦CMD as defined in Equation (9).
The following result can be regarded as a particular case of Proposition 16, where all the
coherent sets of desirable options are maximal ones. As we have seen there too, the diagram
below commutes if we focus on sets of desirable options, but this is not longer the case if





Proposition 19. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D′ ∈ D̄. Then D′ = DCM
D′
and CD′ ⊑CMD′ .
The inequality in Proposition 19 can be strict—meaning that CD′ ⊏CMD′ for some coherent
set of desirable options D′—as we will show in Example 6 below.
As another special case, we consider choice functions associated with Levi’s notion of E-
admissibility [17, Chapter 5]. They are based on a non-empty set of mass functions. Consider
a finite possibility space X , and maps from X to R (the options are gambles now), forming
the vector space V =RX of finite dimension ∣X ∣. The vector ordering ⪯ we associate with
this vector space of options is the pointwise ordering of real maps: u ⪯ v⇔ (∀x ∈X )ux ≤ vx,
where, for instance, ux = u(x) is the x-component of the option u. We call any map p∶X →R
with (∀x ∈X )p(x) ≥ 0 and ∑x∈X p(x) = 1 a (probability) mass function, and we associate
an expectation Ep with p by letting Ep(u) ∶=∑x∈X p(x)ux for all u in V. We collect in ΣX
all the mass functions on X .
With a mass function p, we associate a set of desirable options
Dp ∶= V≻0∪{u ∈ V ∶ Ep(u) > 0} (10)
and a choice function Cp defined for all O in Q by
Cp(O) ∶= {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)(Ep(u) ≥ Ep(v) and u⊀ v)}. (11)
Proposition 20. The set of desirable options Dp and the choice function Cp are coherent
and compatible, and moreover Cp =CDp .
This result allows us to introduce the following, second special case of ‘infimum of maxi-
mality’ choice functions.
Definition 12. With any non-empty set of mass functions K,5 we associate the correspond-
ing E-admissible choice function CEK ∶= inf{Cp ∶ p ∈K} =C{Dp ∶p∈K}.
5Although Levi’s notion of E-admissibility was originally concerned with convex closed sets of mass functions
[17, Chapter 5], we impose no such requirement here on the set K.
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Proposition 21. Given any non-empty set of mass functions K, we have for all O in Q that
CEK(O) = {u ∈O ∶ (∃p ∈K)Ep(u) ∈ argmax
v∈O
Ep(v)}∩Cv(O).
The following proposition establishes a connection between M-admissible and E-admis-
sible choice functions.
Proposition 22. For any non-empty set of mass functions K, CEK ⊑ CMD̂K , where D̂K ∶=
⋃p∈K D̂Dp ⊆ D̂.
The key for this result is that, for any mass function p, there is in general more than one
coherent set of desirable options D that is associated with it by means of the formula
Ep(u) = sup{µ ∶ u−µ ∈D}. (12)
This is why in general coherent sets of desirable options are more informative than (sets
of) mass functions as a belief model. Among all the coherent sets of desirable options
satisfying Equation (12) with respect to a fixed p, the least informative one is the one
given by Equation (10), which is usually referred to as the set of strictly desirable gambles
associated with p within the imprecise probability literature. This in turn gives rise to a
coherent choice function that will be less informative than one determined by a maximal set
of options that is compatible with p by means of Equation (12).
Thus, the choice between E-admissible and M-admissible coherent choice functions can
be made by considering our attitude towards imprecision, that determines the use of strictly
desirable or maximal sets of options: the former are as conservative as possible, and make
a choice only when it is implied by the probability mass function p; while the latter are
as informative as it can be considering the axioms of coherence and the probability mass
function p.
The following examples show why choice functions are more powerful than sets of
desirable options as uncertainty representations, and elucidate the difference between E-
admissible and M-admissible choice functions.
Example 5. Consider the situation where you have a coin with two identical sides of
unknown type:6 either both sides are heads (H), or both sides are tails (T). The random
variable that represents the outcome of a coin flip assumes a value in the finite possibility
space X ∶= {H,T}. The options we consider are gambles: real-valued functions on X , which
constitute the two-dimensional vector space RX , ordered by the pointwise order. We model
this situation using (a) coherent sets of desirable options, (b) M-admissible choice functions,
and (c) E-admissible choice functions. In all three cases we start from two simple models:
one that describes practical certainty of H and another that describes practical certainty of T,
and we take their infimum—the most informative model that is still at most as informative
as either—as a candidate model for the coin problem.
For (a), we use two coherent sets of desirable options DH and DT, expressing practical
certainty of H and T, respectively, given by the maximal sets of desirable options DH ∶=
V≻0∪{u ∈ V ∶ uH > 0} and DT ∶= V≻0∪{u ∈ V ∶ uT > 0}, where uH and uT denote the values
of the gamble u in H and T, respectively. The model for the coin with two identical sides
is then DH∩DT = V≻0. This vacuous model Dv is incapable of distinguishing between this
situation and the one where we are completely ignorant about the coin.
6The example can be trivially reformulated to consider a random variable taking values in a binary possibility
space, with only one of those elements occurring; however we think the use of a coin adds some intuition and
helps in particular when indifference in Section 5 later on.
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For an approach (b) that distinguishes between these two situations, we draw inspiration
from Proposition 15: instead of working with the sets of desirable options themselves, we
move to the corresponding choice functions CH ∶=CDH and CT ∶=CDT , where
CH(O) = {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉DH} = argmax{uH ∶ u ∈O}∩Cv(O)
= argmax{vT ∶ v ∈ argmax{uH ∶ u ∈O}}
CT(O) = argmax{uT ∶ u ∈O}∩Cv(O)
= argmax{vH ∶ v ∈ argmax{uT ∶ u ∈O}}
for all O in Q. We infer that ∣CH(O)∣ = ∣CT(O)∣ = 1 for every O in Q: for instance in the
case of CH, note that amongst all the options attaining the maximum value on heads, exactly
one of them is undominated. The M-admissible choice function we are looking for is
CM{DH,DT} = inf{CH,CT}, which selects at most two options from each option set. It is given
by
CM{DH,DT}(O) = (argmax{uH ∶ u ∈O}∪argmax{uT ∶ u ∈O})∩Cv(O)
for all O in Q, and differs from the vacuous choice function Cv. Indeed, consider the
particular option set O = {u,v,w}, where u = (1,0), v = (0,1) and w = (1/2,1/2). Then
CM{DH,DT}(O) = {u,v} ≠O =Cv(O).
For (c), the set of mass functions K consists of the two degenerate mass functions:
K = {pH, pT}, where pH = (1,0) and pT = (0,1). The corresponding expectations EH ∶= EpH
and ET ∶= EpT satisfy EH(u) = uH and ET(u) = uT for all u in V. So we see that CpH =CH
and CpT =CT, and therefore this approach leads to the same choice function as the previous
one: CE{pH,pT} =C
M
{DH,DT} = inf{CH,CT}. 
The example above shows that the correspondence between desirability and choice
functions is not a complete inf-homomorphism, as illustrated also at the end of Section 3.
Example 6. In this example, we illustrate the difference between E-admissible and M-
admissible choice functions. We consider the same finite possibility space X ∶= {H,T} as
in Example 5, with the same option space and vector ordering. For both E-admissibility
and M-admissibility, we each time consider the least informative choice functions: the
E-admissible choice function CE
ΣX associated with set of all mass functions K = ΣX , and the
M-admissible choice function CMDv associated with the set of all maximal sets of desirable
options D̂Dv = D̂. Since CEΣX and C
M
Dv are the most conservative E-admissible, respectively
M-admissible choice functions, we wonder about their relation, as well as their relation with
the vacuous choice function Cv. We find that CEΣX ⊑C
M
Dv . Indeed, consider any O in Q and
any u in CMDv(O), being equivalent to 0 ∈C
M
Dv(O−{u}) by Proposition 3(i), whence
u ∈CMDv(O)⇔ (∃D̂ ∈ D̂)(∀v ∈O−{u})v ∉ D̂⇔ (∃D̂ ∈ D̂)O−{u}∩ D̂ =∅.
Since for every D̂ in D̂, there is some mass function p in ΣX such that Dp ⊆ D̂ [it suffices
to consider the mass function p corresponding with D̂], we find that
u ∈CMDv(O)⇒ (∃p ∈ ΣX )O−{u}∩Dp =∅⇔ (∃p ∈ ΣX )u ∈CDp (O).
or in other words, u ∈CMDv(O) implies that u ∈C
E




ΣX (O). By the
definition of the vacuous choice function, we have as an intermediate result that Cv ⊑CEΣX ⊑
CMDv .
Both inequalities are strict; to show that Cv ≠CEΣX , consider the option set O ∶= {0,u,v},
where u = (1,−1/4) and v = (−1/4,1). Because all options in O are pointwise undominated in
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O, we find that Cv(O) =O, and in particular, that 0 ∈Cv(O). On the other hand, it follows
from Proposition 21 that
0 ∈CEΣX (O)⇔ (∃p ∈ ΣX )(0 ≥ p(H)−
1
4
p(T) and 0 ≥ −1
4
p(H)+ p(T)),
which would imply that (∃p ∈ ΣX )(0 ≥ 34 p(H)+
3
4 p(T)), which is impossible.
More importantly, we also have that CE
ΣX ≠C
M
Dv . Consider the option set O ∶= {0,u,−u},
where u = (1,−1). Then for the specific mass function p ∶= (1/2,1/2) ∈ ΣX , we find that
0 ∈Cp(O), whence 0 ∈CEΣX (O). To show that 0 ∈C
E
p(O), infer that 0 = Ep(0) = Ep(u) =
Ep(−u), and use Proposition 21 as a characterisation for the E-admissible choice functions.
On the other hand, 0 ∈CMDv(O) is equivalent to u,−u ∉ D̂ for some D̂ in D̂. But u ∉ D̂ and





This example shows that Cv =CD̄ ⊏CEΣX ⊏CD̂ =C
M
Dv . 
As remarked by a reviewer, we can interpret the example above in terms of the choice
relation associated with a choice function, in the following manner: in the case of a complete
preference relation we always have that {0} ⊲C {u,−u} for every option u. This is not the
case for those induced by sets of strictly desirable options, such as the coherent choice
function Cp in the example, which therefore cannot be obtained as infima of a family of
complete choice relations (as are those given by M-admissibility).
In Section 5.7, we will present another example that illustrates the difference between
E-admissible and M-admissible choice functions.
There are other coherent sets of desirable options that can be associated with a mass
function p and that are intermediate between the strictly desirable and the maximal ones.
One example are the so-called lexicographic sets of desirable options, which we have
investigated in detail elsewhere [32]. Taking into account Proposition 18, we can also define
coherent choice functions by taking the infimum of a family of coherent choice functions
determined by such lexicographic sets. Indeed, this provides another example of coherent
choice function that admits an axiomatic characterisation in some cases, as reported in [32].
To conclude this section, we want to mention that there are other popular choice rules
besides maximality and E-admissibility, such as, amongst others, Γ-maximin, Γ-maximax
and interval dominance [30]. However, they are not coherent: none of them is guaranteed to
satisfy, amongst others, Axiom C4b.
5. INDIFFERENCE
5.1. Indifference and desirability. For sets of desirable gambles, there is a systematic
way of modelling indifference [8, 11, 20]. In what follows, we recall how to do this, but
formulate everything in terms of the more abstract notion of options, rather than gambles.
In addition to a subject’s set of desirable options D—the options he strictly prefers to
the zero option—we can also consider the options that he considers to be equivalent to
the zero option. We call these options indifferent. A set of indifferent options I is simply a
subset of V, but as before with desirable options, we pay special attention to coherent sets
of indifferent options.
Definition 13. A set of indifferent options I is called coherent if for all u,v in V and λ in R:
I1. 0 ∈ I;
I2. if u ∈ V≻0∪V≺0 then u ∉ I;
I3. if u ∈ I then λu ∈ I;
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I4. if u,v ∈ I then u+v ∈ I.
Taken together, Axioms I3 and I4 are equivalent to imposing that span(I) = I, and due to
Axiom I1, I is non-empty and therefore a linear subspace of V.
The interaction between indifferent and desirable options is subject to rationality criteria
as well: they should be compatible with one another.
Definition 14. Given a set of desirable options D and a coherent set of indifferent options
I, we call D compatible with I if D+ I ⊆D.
The smallest such compatible coherent set of indifferent options is always the trivial one,
given by the null space I = {0}. The idea behind Definition 14 is that adding an indifferent
option to a desirable option does not make it non-desirable, or also, that adding a desirable
option to an indifferent one makes it desirable.
Since D ⊆ D + I due to Axiom I1, compatibility of D and I is equivalent to D + I = D.
An immediate consequence of compatibility between a coherent set of desirable options D
and a coherent set of indifferent options I is that D∩ I =∅, meaning that no option can be
assessed as desirable—strictly preferred to the zero option—and indifferent—equivalent to
the zero option—at the same time.
5.2. Indifference and quotient spaces. In order to introduce indifference for choice func-
tions, we build on a coherent set of indifferent options I, as defined in Definition 13. Two
options u and v are considered to be indifferent, to a subject, whenever v−u is indifferent to
the zero option, or in other words whenever v−u ∈ I. The underlying idea will be that we
identify indifferent options, and choose between equivalence classes of indifferent options,
rather than between single options. We formalise this intuition below.
We collect all options that are indifferent to an option u ∈ V into the equivalence class
[u] ∶= {v ∈ V ∶ v−u ∈ I} = {u}+ I.
We also denote [u] as u/I. Of course, [0] = {0}+ I = I is a linear subspace, and the [u] =
{u}+ I are affine subspaces of V. The set of all these equivalence classes is the quotient
space
V/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈ V} = {{u}+ I ∶ u ∈ V} = {u/I ∶ u ∈ V}.
This quotient space is a vector space under the vector addition, given by
[u]+ [v] = {u}+ I+{v}+ I = {u+v}+ I = [u+v] for u,v ∈ V,
and the scalar multiplication, given by
λ [u] = λ({u}+ I) = {λu}+ I = [λu] for u ∈ V and λ ∈R.
[0] = I is the additive identity of V/I.
That we identify indifferent options, and therefore express preferences between equiv-
alence classes of indifferent options, essentially means that we define choice functions
on Q(V/I). But in order to characterise coherence for such choice functions, we need to
introduce a convenient vector ordering on V/I that is appropriately related to the vector
ordering on V; see Section 2.2. For two elements [u] and [v] of V/I, we define
[u] ⪯ [v]⇔ (∃w ∈ I)u ⪯ v+w, (13)
and as usual, the strict variant of the vector ordering on V/I is characterised by
[u] ≺ [v]⇔ ([u] ⪯ [v] and [u] ≠ [v]).
We begin by showing that this is indeed a vector ordering:
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Proposition 23. The ordering ⪯ on V/I is a vector ordering, and [u] ≺ [v]⇔ (∃w ∈ I)u ≺
v+w for any u,v in V.
We use the notation O/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈O} = {u/I ∶ u ∈O} for the option set of equivalence
classes [u] associated with the options u in an option set O in Q(V). The map ⋅/I is an onto
map from Q(V) to Q(V/I) that preserves set inclusion:
(∀O1,O2 ∈Q(V)) (O1 ⊆O2⇒O1/I ⊆O2/I). (14)
5.3. Quotient spaces and sets of desirable options. We use this quotient space to prove
interesting characterisations of indifference for sets of desirable options.
Proposition 24. A set of desirable options D ⊆ V is compatible with a coherent set of
indifferent options I if and only if there is some (representing) set of desirable options
D′ ⊆ V/I such that D = {u ∶ [u] ∈ D′} =⋃D′. Moreover, the representing set of desirable
options is unique and given by D′ =D/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈D}.
This, together with the definition of compatibility, shows that the correspondence between
sets of desirable options on V and (their representing) sets of desirable options on V/I is
one-to-one and onto. It also preserves coherence.
Proposition 25. Consider any set of desirable options D ⊆ V that is compatible with a
coherent set of indifferent options I, and its representing set of desirable options D/I ⊆ V/I.
Then D is coherent if and only if D/I is.
5.4. Quotient spaces and choice functions. The discussion above inspires us to combine
indifference with choice functions in the following manner: given a coherent set of indiffer-
ent options I, we say that a choice function is compatible with it when it is determined by
its restriction to the quotient space that I induces.
Definition 15. We call a choice function C on Q(V) compatible with a coherent set of
indifferent options I if there is some representing choice function C′ on Q(V/I) such that
C(O) = {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈C′(O/I)} for all O in Q(V).
This definition can be stated in terms of choice relations as well. We call a choice relation ⊲
on Q(V) compatible with I if there is some representing choice relation ⊲′ on Q(V/I) such
that O1 ⊲ O2⇔O1/I ⊲′ O2/I for all O1 and O2 in Q(V).
Proposition 26. Consider any choice function C that is compatible with I, then ⊲C is
compatible with I as well. Conversely, consider any choice relation ⊲ that is compatible
with I, then C⊲ is compatible with I as well.
Definition 15 allows for characterisations that are similar to the ones for desirability
in Propositions 24 and 25. If a choice function on Q(V) is compatible with I then the
representing choice function on Q(V/I) is necessarily unique, and we denote it by C/I:
Proposition 27. For any choice function C onQ(V) that is compatible with some coherent
set of indifferent options I, the unique representing choice function C/I on Q(V/I) is given
by C/I(O/I) ∶=C(O)/I for all O in Q(V). Hence also
C(O) =O∩(⋃C/I(O/I)) for all O in Q(V).
This, together with the definition of compatibility, shows that the correspondence between
choice functions onQ(V) and (their representing) choice functions onQ(V/I) is one-to-one
and onto. It also preserves coherence:
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Proposition 28. Consider any choice function C onQ(V) that is compatible with a coherent
set of indifferent options I, and its representing choice function C/I on Q(V/I). Then C is
coherent if and only if C/I is.
To conclude this general discussion of indifference for choice functions, we mention
that it is closed under arbitrary infima, which enables conservative inference under indiffer-
ence: we can consider the least informative choice function that is compatible with some
assessments and is still compatible with a given coherent set of indifferent options.
Proposition 29. Consider any coherent set of indifferent options I, and any non-empty
collection of coherent choice functions {Ci ∶ i ∈ I} that are compatible with I, then its
coherent infimum inf{Ci ∶ i ∈ I} is compatible with I as well, and C/I = inf{Ci/I ∶ i ∈ I}.
In particular, the least informative coherent choice function C that is compatible with a
coherent set of indifferent options I corresponds to the case where the associated choice
function C/I on the quotient space Q(V/I) is the vacuous one Cv, meaning that
C(O) = {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈Cv(O/I)} = {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)[u]⊀ [v]} for all O in Q(V).
5.5. The relation with other definitions of indifference. Seidenfeld [24] has a rather
different approach to combining a notion of indifference with choice functions. After
making the necessary translation from horse lotteries to gambles, it can be summarised as
follows. Rather than, as we have done above, starting out with a notion of indifference and
then looking at which choice functions are compatible with it, he starts from a given choice
function C, and associates a binary relation ≈C on V with it as follows:
u ≈C v⇔ (∀O ∈Q)({u,v} ⊆O⇒ (u ∈C(O)⇔ v ∈C(O))) for all u,v in V. (15)
The idea behind this definition is that two options are considered to be related if both
options are either chosen or rejected, whenever both are available. This relation has the
following interesting properties, which are instrumental in elucidating the relationship
between Seidenfeld’s approach and ours:
Proposition 30. Let C be a coherent choice function. Then ≈C is an equivalence relation
that furthermore satisfies
(i) u ≈C v⇒ λu ≈C λv;
(ii) u ≈C v⇒ u+w ≈C v+w;
for all u,v,w ∈ V and all λ ∈R. As a consequence, the set IC ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ u ≈C 0} is a coherent
set of indifferent options.
Indeed, the coherent set of indifferent options IC turns out to be the largest that C is
compatible with:
Proposition 31. Consider a coherent set of indifferent options I and a coherent choice
function C on Q(V). Then C is compatible with I if and only if I is a linear subspace of IC .
It follows that if C is compatible with I, then C is automatically also compatible with any
subspace of I, and that the largest linear subspace that C is compatible with, is IC . Also,
this proposition shows that the smallest set of indifferent option that is compatible with
C, is given by I = {0}, and that set of indifferent options is compatible with any coherent
choice function. Seidenfeld’s approach starts from a choice function, and identifies the
coarsest equivalence—or indifference—relation that is compatible with it. Though we have
seen that it is related, our approach, because it starts out with an indifference relation,
goes the other way around, is more constructive, and is better suited for studying which
choice functions are compatible with a given indifference relation, and therefore also for
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performing conservative inference for choice functions under indifference. We will come
back to this idea in Sections 5.7 and 5.8.
Proposition 31 also shows that our approach is closely connected to Bradley’s [4, Sec-
tion 2], which he has linked to the notion of sequential coherence: for him, for a choice
function to ‘satisfy’—in our words: to ‘be compatible with’—an equivalence relation, it
must be finer than Seidenfeld’s ≈C .
Finally, note that a relation analogous to Equation (15) can be established for coherent
sets of desirable options D: we simply define u ≈D v⇔ u ≈CD v for all u and v in V. Then
u ≈D v⇔ (∀O ∈Q)({u,v} ⊆O⇒ (0 ∈CD(O−{u})⇔ 0 ∈CD(O−{v})))
⇔ (∀O ∈Q)({u,v} ⊆O⇒ (O−{u}∩D ≠∅⇔O−{v}∩D ≠∅)) for all u,v in V,
using Axiom C4b for the first equivalence and Equation (8) for the second one. Use
Lemma 32 to infer that
u ≈D v⇔D+{u} =D+{v} for all u,v in V.
Lemma 32. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D. Then
(∀O ∈Q)({u,v} ⊆O⇒ (O−{u}∩D ≠∅⇔O−{v}∩D ≠∅))⇔D+{u} =D+{v}
for all u and v in V.
5.6. The relation with desirability. There is an interesting relationship between the co-
herent choice functions and the coherent sets of desirable options that are compatible with a
fixed coherent set of indifferent options.
Proposition 33. Consider any coherent set of indifferent options I.
(i) If C is any coherent choice function compatible with I, then the corresponding
coherent set of desirable options DC is also compatible with I, and DC/I =DC/I .
(ii) If D is any coherent set of desirable options compatible with I, then the corresponding
coherent choice function CD is also compatible with I, and CD/I =CD/I .
5.7. Example: fair coins. To exhibit the power and simplicity of our definition of indiffer-
ence, we reconsider the finite possibility space X ∶= {H,T} of Example 5, where the vector
space V is again the two-dimensional vector space RX of real-valued functions on X , or
gambles, and the vector ordering ⪯ is the usual pointwise ordering of gambles.
We want to express indifference between heads and tails, or in other words between IH
and IT, where IH ∶= (1,0) and IT ∶= (0,1). This means that IH− IT is considered equivalent
to the zero gamble, so the linear space of all gambles that are equivalent to zero—or in other
words, the set of indifferent gambles (or options)—is then given by
I = {λ(IH− IT) ∶ λ ∈R} = {u ∈RX ∶ Ep(u) = 0},
where Ep is the expectation associated with the uniform mass function p = (1/2,1/2) on
{H,T}, associated with a fair coin: Ep(u) ∶= 12 [uH+uT]. So, for any option u in R
X—any
real-valued function on X :
[u] = {u}+ I = {v ∈RX ∶ Ep(v) = Ep(u)},
which tells us that the equivalence class [u] can be characterised by the common uniform
expectation Ep(u) of its elements. Therefore, RX /I has unit dimension, and we can identify
it with the real line R. The vector ordering between equivalence classes is given by, using
Equation (13):
[u] ⪯ [v]⇔ (∃λ ∈R)u ⪯ v+λ(IH− IT)
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⇔ (∃λ ∈R)(uH ≤ vH+λ and uT ≤ vT−λ)
⇔ (∃λ ∈R)uH−vH ≤ λ ≤ −uT+vT
⇔ uH−vH ≤ −uT+vT⇔ Ep(u) ≤ Ep(v),
and similarly [u] ≺ [v]⇔Ep(u) <Ep(v) for all u,v in RX . Hence, the strict vector ordering
≺ on RX /I is total, so we infer from the argumentation in Example 3 that there is only one
representing choice function, namely the vacuous one. Therefore, there is only one choice
function C onQ(RX ) that is compatible with I, namely, the one that has the vacuous choice
function Cv on Q(RX /I) as its representation C/I. Recall that for any O in Q(RX ):
Cv(O/I) = {[u] ∶ (∀[v] ∈O/I)[u]⊀ [v]}
= {[u] ∶ (∀[v] ∈O/I)[v] ⪯ [u]}
= {[u] ∶ (∀[v] ∈O/I)Ep(v) ≤ Ep(u)},
and therefore
C(O) ∶= {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)Ep(v) ≤ Ep(u)} =CE{p}(O).
The indifference assessment between heads and tails leaves us no choice but to use an
E-admissible model for a probability mass function, associated with a fair coin.
The choice function C is therefore based on E-admissibility, but is not compatible with
M-admissibility. To see this, consider the set of options O ∶= {w,0,−w} with w ∶= (1,−1),
so wH+wT = 0. Hence C(O) =O; but no M-admissible choice function will select 0 in O:
observe that 0 ∉CD̂(O) for all D̂ ∈D′, because 0 ∈CD̂(O) would imply that {w,−w}∩D̂ =∅,
contradicting that D̂ is a maximal set of desirable options by Proposition 10.
5.8. Choice functions and symmetry. As another example showing how powerful our
approach to dealing with choice and indifference is, we will prove a simple and elegant rep-
resentation result that tells us how to perform conservative inference with choice functions
under a permutation symmetry assessment.
We consider a finite possibility space X , where the vector space V of options is the finite-
dimensional vector space RrX , of Rr-valued functions on X , or vector-valued gambles on
the outcome of an uncertain variable X in X . The vector ordering ⪯ is the usual pointwise
ordering of such vector-valued gambles.7
We assume there is symmetry lurking behind the uncertain variable X , represented by a
group P of permutations of the set of possible outcomes X—the idea being that a subject
assesses that no distinction should be made between an outcome x and its permutations
πx, for π ∈P—or in other words, between the variable X and its permutations πX . If we
consider any vector-valued gamble u(X) on the variable X , then the subject will therefore
be indifferent between the uncertain vector-valued rewards u(X) and u(πX). The smallest
coherent8 set of indifferent options IP that corresponds to this indifference assessment, is
therefore given by
IP ∶= span({u−π tu ∶ u ∈ V and π ∈P}),
7The reason why we work with vector-valued gambles here rather than real-valued ones, is because Zaffalon
and Miranda [36] have shown that this leads to an approach to modelling uncertainty that is even more general
than the typical imprecise probability approach.
8The requirement that IP ∩V≺0 =∅—or equivalently IP ∩V≻0 =∅—is related to the left amenability of the
finite permutation group P [9, 34], and is easily shown to be satisfied.
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where we defined the linear permutation operator π t on the linear space of options (vector-
valued gambles) V by π tu = u○π , or in other words
(π tu)(x) ∶= u(πx) for all u in V, x in X and π in P .
Let us, for any x in X , define the permutation invariant atom [x]P containing x as
[x]P ∶= {πx ∶ π ∈P}.
These atoms constitute a partition of X , and we denote the set of all of them by AP ∶=
{[x]P ∶ x ∈X}. A vector-valued gamble u is called P-invariant if π tu = u for all π in P , and
it is not hard to see that this is equivalent to u being constant on the invariant atoms. The set
of all P-invariant vector-valued gambles is denoted by VP , and it is a linear subspace of V
that is clearly isomorphic to the linear space of all vector-valued functions on AP , whose
dimension r∣AP ∣ is typically much lower than that of V.
A choice function that takes the symmetry assessment into account is—as we have
argued—one that is compatible with IP and all of its subspaces. What we will do now, is to
investigate how such compatible choice functions can be represented by choice functions on
a typically much lower-dimensional option space: symmetry reduces complexity. Most of
the work for this has already been done in Definition 15 and Proposition 27, which indeed
states that choice functions compatible with IP can be represented uniquely by choice
functions on the lower-dimensional quotient space V/IP . The only thing we need to do, is
take a closer look at this quotient space and its elements.






tu, for all u in V. (16)
It satisfies the following very interesting properties:
Proposition 34. invP is a linear transformation of V, and
(i) invP ○π t = invP = π t ○ invP for all π in P;
(ii) invP ○ invP = invP ;
(iii) kern(invP) = IP ;
(iv) rng(invP) = VP .
Moreover, for any u,v in V, we have that v ∈ u/IP⇔ invP v = invP u,
The various statements in this proposition tell us that invP is a linear projection operator
that maps any vector-valued gamble u to the corresponding uniquely P-invariant member
invP u of the equivalence class u/IP , which is essentially a vector-valued gamble on AP .
By Proposition 27, every coherent choice function C on V that is compatible with IP
therefore has a unique representing coherent choice function CP on the typically much
lower-dimensional linear space of all vector-valued gambles on AP , with
C(O) = {u ∈O ∶ invP u ∈CP(invPO)}.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown how the theory of choice functions may be used, with a
choice of axioms to model decision problems where the choices are not uniquely determined
by the pairwise comparisons, and where models of sets of desirable gambles therefore come
up short.
We have made our formalisation in terms of sets of options, because this more general
structure has allowed us to make a connection with modelling indifference. Nevertheless, our
models remain applicable in particular to choices on sets of gambles, and thus encompass
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much of the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities as a particular case. A deeper study
of the definition in terms of horse lotteries, which is the model considered by Seidenfeld
[24], is one of our future lines of research. We have established that choice functions can be
equivalent formulated as choice relations, that is, binary relations in terms of sets of options.
This formulation adds intuition to some of the results in the paper.
We have seen that three important types of decision models can be subsumed into
our theory of choice functions: one, as we have said, is that of sets of desirable options,
which give rise to the choice functions defined via maximality; the others are those based
on a family of sets of probability measures or, closely related, a family of maximal sets
of desirable gambles. We have named these two types of models E-admissible and M-
admissible choice functions, and we have shown that there are subtle differences between
them. Related to this, one future line of research would be the study of maximal coherent
choice functions, which are those that are not above any other choice function. As suggested
by one reviewer, it may be useful here to use the equivalent formulation in terms of choice
relations and to use the notion of consequence operator [6].
One of the advantages of sets of desirable options over sets of probability measures is
that they are more suited to conditioning when sets of (lower) probability zero are involved,
as discussed for instance by Quaeghebeur [19]. We intend to investigate in detail in future
work how conditioning for choice functions should be defined.
Finally, we have given an axiomatisation of sets of indifferent options and their com-
patibility with choice functions, and have shown how our definition is related to other
approaches proposed in the literature. The investigation of this interesting connection under
our framework is another open avenue for future research.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. We have to check that ⊲C satisfies the two conditions of Definition 2.
For (i), consider any O, O1 and O2 in Q such that O2 ∖O1 ⊆ O ⊆ O1 ∪O2. Then O1 ∪O =
O1∪O2, which sets off the following cascade of equivalences:
O1 ⊲C O⇔C(O1∪O) ⊆O∖O1
⇔C(O1∪O2) ⊆O∖O1
⇔C(O1∪O2) ⊆ (O1∪O2)∩(O∖O1) because C(O1∪O2) ⊆O1∪O2
⇔C(O1∪O2) ⊆O2∖O1⇔O1 ⊲C O2,
where the penultimate equivalence follows from the equalities: (O1 ∪O2)∩ (O ∖O1) =
O2∩O∩Oc1 =O∩(O2∖O1)=O2∖O1, because by assumption O ⊇O2∖O1. For (ii), consider
any O, O1 and O2 in Q such that O1 ∪O2 ⊆ O. Then O1 ∪O = O2 ∪O = O, which sets off
the following cascade of equivalences:
O1 ⊲C O and O2 ⊲C O⇔C(O1∪O) ⊆O∖O1 and C(O2∪O) ⊆O∖O2
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⇔C(O) ⊆O∖O1 and C(O) ⊆O∖O2
⇔C(O) ⊆O∖(O1∪O2)⇔O1∪O2 ⊲C O. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For the first statement, consider any choice function C, and any O
in Q, and infer that
C⊲C (O) =⋂{O
′ ⊆O ∶O∖O′ ⊲C O} =⋂{O′ ⊆O ∶C((O∖O′)∪O) ⊆O∖(O∖O′)}
=⋂{O′ ⊆O ∶C(O) ⊆O′} =C(O),
using the fact that C(O) ⊆O.
For the second statement, consider any choice relation ⊲, and any O1 and O2 in Q, and
infer that
O1 ⊲C⊲ O2⇔O1∩C⊲(O1∪O2) =∅
⇔O1∩(O1∪O2∖⋃{O′ ⊆O1∪O2 ∶O′ ⊲ O1∪O2}) =∅
⇔O1 ⊆⋃{O′ ⊆O1∪O2 ∶O′ ⊲ O1∪O2}.
Call O3 ∶=⋃{O′ ⊆ O1 ∪O2 ∶ O′ ⊲ O1 ∪O2}. Since O1 ∪O2 is finite, and therefore O3 is a
finite union, we infer from Definition 2(ii) that O3 ⊲ O1∪O2. If O1 ⊆O3 then Definition 2(ii)
implies that then O1 ⊲ O1∪O2. Conversely, if O1 ⊲ O1∪O2, then O1 ⊆O3 by the definition
of O3, so O1 ⊲C⊲ O2 is equivalent to O1 ⊲ O1∪O2, which is in turn equivalent to O1 ⊲ O2
by Definition 2(i).
For the third statement, assume first that ⊲C=⊲. Then the corresponding choice functions
are equal: C⊲C =C⊲ . But we have just shown that C⊲C =C, whence indeed C =C⊲ . Conversely,
assume that C⊲ =C. Then the corresponding choice relations are equal: ⊲C⊲=⊲C . But we
have just shown that ⊲C⊲=⊲, whence indeed ⊲=⊲C . 
Lemma 35. Õ∩C(O) =∅ is equivalent to C(O) ⊆O∖ Õ for any C in C and O,Õ in Q.
Proof. Since for any choice function it holds that C(O) ⊆O, the inclusion C(O) ⊆O∖ Õ =
O∩ Õc is equivalent to C(O) ⊆ Õc, that is, to C(O)∩ Õ =∅. 
Proof of Axiom C3a⇔ Equation (3), and of Axiom C3b⇔ Equation (4). That Axiom C3a
and Equation (3) are equivalent follows immediately from Lemma 35.
Let us establish the equivalence between Axiom C3b and Equation (4). For necessity,
consider any O,O1,O2 inQ such that O ⊆O1 and O1∩C(O2) =∅, or equivalently, C(O2) ⊆
O2 ∖O1, by Lemma 35. Let Õ ∶= O ∩O2, Õ1 ∶= O2 ∖O1 and Õ2 ∶= O2, then C(Õ2) ⊆ Õ1,
and Õ2 ∖ Õ1 = O2 ∖ (O2 ∖O1) = O1 ∩O2, whence Õ = O ∩O2 ⊆ O1 ∩O2 = Õ2 ∖ Õ1. Due
to Axiom C3b, then C(Õ2 ∖ Õ) ⊆ Õ1, whence C(O2 ∖O) ⊆ O2 ∖O1. By Definition 1, we
have that C(O2 ∖O) ⊆ O2 ∖O, and hence C(O2 ∖O) ⊆ (O2 ∖O)∖O1. Then indeed O1 ∩
C(O2∖O)=∅, because of Lemma 35. For sufficiency, consider any O,O1,O2 inQ such that
O ⊆O2∖O1 and C(O2)⊆O1, implying that (O2∖O1)∩C(O2)=∅. Let Õ ∶=O, Õ1 ∶=O2∖O1
and Õ2 ∶= O2, then Õ ⊆ Õ1 and Õ1 ∩C(Õ2) = ∅. Due to Equation (4), then Õ1 ∩C(Õ2 ∖
Õ) = ∅, or equivalently, C(Õ2 ∖ Õ) ⊆ (Õ2 ∖ Õ)∖ Õ1, because C(Õ2 ∖ Õ) ⊆ Õ2 ∖ Õ. Then
C(O2 ∖O) ⊆ (O2 ∖O)∖ (O2 ∖O1). But (O2 ∖O)∖ (O2 ∖O1) = O2 ∩O1, implying that
indeed C(O2∖O) ⊆O2∩O1 ⊆O1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. For (i), we consider any O in Q, λ in R>0 and u in V, and prove
that λC(O) = C(λO) and C(O)+ {u} = C(O + {u}). That λC(O) ⊆ C(λO) follows at
once from Axiom C4a. For the converse inclusion, let O′ ∶= λO, then it follows from
Axiom C4a that 1λ C(O
′) ⊆C( 1
λ
O′), which is equivalent to 1
λ
C(λO) ⊆C(O). Next, that
C(O)+{u} ⊆C(O+{u}) follows directly from Axiom C4b. For the converse inclusion, let
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O′ ∶=O+{u}, then it follows from Axiom C4b that C(O′)+{−u} ⊆C(O′+{−u}), which is
equivalent to C(O+{u}) ⊆C(O)+{u}.
For (ii), fix any u1 and u2 in V such that u1 ⪯ u2, any O in Q and any v in O∖{u1,u2}.
The proof is trivial if u1 = u2, so assume that u1 ≺ u2, whence u1 ∉C({u1,u2}) by Axiom C2.
To prove (ii)a, assume that u2 ∈O and v ∉C(O∪{u1}), then by version (3) [with Õ1 ∶= {u1},
Õ2 ∶= {u1,u2} and Õ ∶= O ∪{u1}] of Axiom C3a, we conclude that u1 ∉C(O ∪{u1}) and
therefore {u1,v}∩C(O ∪{u1}) = ∅. Version (4) [with Õ1 ∶= {u1,v}, Õ ∶= {u1} and Õ2 ∶=
O ∪{u1}] of Axiom C3b then implies that v ∉C(O ∖{u1}). Version (3) [with Õ1 ∶= {v},
Õ2 ∶= O ∖ {u1} and Õ ∶= O] of Axiom C3a then implies that indeed v ∉C(O). For (ii)b,
assume that u1 ∈O and v ∉C(O), then by version (3) [with Õ1 ∶= {u1} for the first assumption
and Õ1 ∶= {v} for the second one, Õ2 ∶= O and Õ ∶= {u2}∪O] of Axiom C3a, the first
assumption implies that u1 ∉C({u2}∪O), and the second assumption implies similarly
that v ∉C({u2}∪O), whence {u1,v}∩C({u2}∪O) =∅. By version (4) [with Õ1 ∶= {u1,v},
Õ2 ∶= {u2}∪O and Õ ∶= {u1}] of Axiom C3b, this implies that indeed v ∉C({u2}∪O∖{u1}).
For (iii), consider any O,O′ in Q such that C(O) ⊆ O′ ⊆ O. Let Õ1 ∶=C(O), Õ2 ∶= O
and Õ ∶= O ∖O′, and apply Axiom C3b [we have C(Õ2) = C(O) = Õ1, so C(Õ2) ⊆ Õ1,
and also Õ = Õ ∖O′ ⊆ Õ2 ∖C(O) = Õ2 ∖ Õ1] to find that C(Õ2 ∖ Õ) ⊆ Õ1, or equivalently,
C(O′) ⊆C(O). Conversely, consider any u ∈C(O) and assume ex absurdo that u ∉C(O′),
then we infer from version (3) [with Õ1 ∶= {u}, Õ2 ∶= O′ and Õ ∶= O] of Axiom C3a that
u ∉C(O), a contradiction.
(iv) is an immediate consequence of (iii) [with O′ =C(O)]. 
Proof of Proposition 4. For (i), irreflexivity is Axiom S1. For transitivity, consider any O1,
O2 and O3 in Q, and assume that O1 ⊲ O2 and O2 ⊲ O3. Use Axiom S3a to infer that
then O1 ⊲ O1 ∪O2 ∪O3 and O2 ⊲ O1 ∪O2 ∪O3. By Definition 2(ii) this is equivalent to
O1∪O2 ⊲ O1∪O2∪O3. Now, use Axiom S3b [with Õ1 ∶= O1∪O2, Õ2 ∶= O1∪O2∪O3 and
Õ ∶=O2∖(O1∪O3) ⊆ Õ1; then Õ1∖Õ = (O1∪O2)∖(O2∖(O1∪O3)) =O1∪(O2∩O3) and
Õ2∖Õ = (O1∪O2∪O3)∖(O2∖(O1∪O3))=O1∪O3] to infer that O1∪(O2∩O3)⊲ O1∪O3,
and therefore O1 ⊲ O1∪O3 using Definition 2(ii). Then indeed O1 ⊲ O3 by Definition 2(i).
For (ii), consider any O1 and O2 in Q, any u in V and any λ in R>0. For the direct
implication, assume that O1 ⊲ O2. Then λO1 ⊲ λO2 by Axiom S4a and therefore indeed
λO1+{u} ⊲ λO2+{u} by Axiom S4b. Conversely, for the converse implication, assume
that λO1+{u} ⊲ λO2+{u}. Then λO1 ⊲ λO2 by Axiom S4b and therefore indeed O1 ⊲ O2
by Axiom S4a. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We first prove the first statement. We show that ⊲C satisfies the
Axioms S1–S4.
For Axiom S1, consider any O in Q. Since C(O) ≠ ∅ by Axiom C1, we infer that
C(O) ⊈∅ =O∖O, whence indeed O ⋪C O.
For Axiom S2, assume that u ≺ v. Then {v} =C({u,v}) by Axiom C2, so C({u,v}) ⊆
{v}∖{u}. Then indeed {u} ⊲C {v}.
For Axiom S3a, assume that O1 ⊲C O2 and O2 ⊆ O. Then O1 ∩C(O1 ∪O2) = ∅ by
Definition 3. Use version (3) of Axiom C3a [with Õ1 ∶=O1, Õ2 ∶=O1∪O2 and Õ ∶=O1∪O;
then Õ1 ⊆ Õ2 ⊆ Õ since O2 ⊆ O] to infer that then O1 ∩C(O1 ∪O) = ∅, whence indeed
O1 ⊲C O.
For Axiom S3b, assume that O1 ⊲C O2 and O ⊂ O1. Then O1 ∩C(O1 ∪O2) = ∅ by
Definition 3. Use version (4) of Axiom C3b [with Õ1 ∶= O1, Õ2 ∶= O1 ∪O2 and Õ ∶= O;
then Õ ⊆ Õ1] to infer that O1 ∩C((O1 ∪O2)∖O) = ∅, and hence in particular that (O1 ∖
O)∩C((O1∪O2)∖O) =∅. Then O1∖O ⊲C (O1∖O)∪(O2∖O). Use Definition 2(i) [with
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Õ1 ∶= O1 ∖O, Õ2 ∶= (O1 ∖O)∪ (O2 ∖O) and Õ ∶= O2 ∖O; then Õ2 ∖ Õ1 ⊆ Õ ⊆ Õ1 ∪ Õ2] to
infer that then indeed O1∖O ⊲C O2∖O.
For Axioms S4a and S4b, assume that O1 ⊲C O2. We need to show that then λO1+{u} ⊲C
λO2 + {u}. To do so, from O1 ⊲C O2 infer that O1 ∩C(O1 ∪O2) = ∅, so (λO1 + {u})∩
(λC(O1∪O2)+{u}) =∅. Then use Proposition 3(i) to infer that (λO1+{u})∩C(λ(O1∪
O2)+{u}) =∅, whence indeed λO1+{u} ⊲C λO2+{u}.
For the second statement, we need to show that C⊲ satisfies the Axioms C1–C4.
For Axiom C1, consider any O in Q. Then O ⋪ O by Axiom S1, so {u} ⋪ O for some u
in O, by Definition 2(ii). Then u ∈C⊲(O) ∶= O∖⋃{O′ ⊆ O ∶O′ ⊲ O}, so C⊲(O) is indeed
non-empty.
For Axiom C2, assume that u ≺ v. Then {u} ⊲ {v} by Axiom S2, so C⊲({u,v})∩{u} =∅.
Since C⊲({u,v}) is non-empty, as shown above, then necessarily v ∈C⊲({u,v}), so indeed
{v} =C⊲({u,v}).
For version (3) of Axiom C3a, assume that O1 ∩C⊲(O2) = ∅ and O1 ⊆ O2 ⊆ O. Since
O1 ⊆ O2, then O2 = O1 ∪O2, so O1 ∩C⊲(O1 ∪O2) = ∅, whence O1 ⊲ O2. Then O1 ⊲ O by
Axiom S3a, so O1∩C⊲(O∪O1) =∅, and since O∪O1 =O, indeed O1∩C⊲(O) =∅.
For version (4) of Axiom C3b, assume that O1 ∩C⊲(O2) = ∅ and O ⊆ O1. We need
to prove that then O1∩C⊲(O2∖O) =∅. From O1∩C⊲(O2) =∅, and using that C⊲(O2) =
O2∖⋃{O′ ⊆O2 ∶O′ ⊲ O2}, infer that O1∩O2 ⊆⋃{O′ ⊆O2 ∶O′ ⊲ O2}, whence O1∩O2 ⊲ O2,
taking into account Definition 2(ii). Call O′ ∶=O∩O2, then (O1∩O2)∖O′ = (O1∩O2)∖O
and O2 ∖O′ = O2 ∖O. Also O′ ⊆ O1 ∩O2, so either O′ = O1 ∩O2 or O′ ⊂ O1 ∩O2. If O′ =
O1∩O2 then (O1∩O2)∖O′ =∅ whence (O1∩O2)∖O′∩C(O2∖O′) =∅ trivially. But since
C(O2 ∖O′) ⊆ O2 ∖O′, then also O1 ∩C(O2 ∖O′) =∅ and hence indeed O1 ∩C(O2 ∖O) =
∅. So assume O′ ⊂ O1 ∩O2. Then Axiom S3b implies that (O1 ∩O2)∖O′ ⊲ O2 ∖O′, or
equivalently, replacing O′ with O ∩O2, that (O1 ∩O2)∖ (O ∩O2) ⊲ O2 ∖ (O ∩O2). Infer
that (O1∩O2)∖(O∩O2) = (O1∩O2)∖O and O2∖(O∩O2) =O2∖O, and therefore (O1∩
O2)∖O ⊲ O2∖O. Then (O1∩O2)∖O∩C⊲(O2∖O) =∅, and since C⊲(O2∖O) ⊆ O2∖O,
we find that indeed O1∩C⊲(O2∖O) =∅.
For Axioms C4a and C4b, assume that O1 ⊆C⊲(O2). We need to show that then λO1+
{u} ⊆C⊲(λO2 + {u}). To do so, from O1 ⊆C⊲(O2) infer that O1 ⊆ O2 and hence O2 =
O1 ∪O2, whence C⊲(O1 ∪O2) ⊆ O2 ∖O1. Then O1 ŗelO2, so λO1 + {u} ⊲ λO2 + {u} by
Axioms S4a and S4b, whence C⊲(λ(O1 ∪O2)+ {u}) ⊆ λ(O2 ∖O1)+ {u}. Taking into
account that O1∪O2 =O2, then indeed λO1+{u} ⊆C⊲(λO2+{u}). 
Proof of Proposition 7. The map f we are looking for is f ∶C → S ∶C↦ f (C) ∶=⊲C . Due to
Proposition 2, f is an invertible function with inverse f −1∶S → C∶⊲↦ f −1(⊲) ∶=C⊲ , and
hence f is a bijection between C and S .
For the first statement, we prove that (C;⊑) and (S;⊑S) are order isomorphic. We first
show that C1 ⊑C2⇒ f (C1) ⊑S f (C2). So consider any two choice functions C1 and C2 such
that C1 ⊑C2. Then C1(O) ⊇C2(O) for all O inQ. Consider any O1 and O2 inQ and assume
that O1 ⊲C1 O2. Then O1∩C1(O1∪O2) =∅, and hence also O1∩C2(O1∪O2) =∅. But then
O1 ⊲C2 O2, so indeed ⊲C1⊑S⊲C2 . To show that f (C1) ⊑S f (C2)⇒C1 ⊑ C2, it suffices to
consider any two choice relation ⊲1 and ⊲2 such that ⊲1⊑S⊲2, and prove that C⊲1 ⊑ C⊲2 ,
because the map f is a bijection. So assume that ⊲1⊑S⊲2. Then O1 ⊲1 O2⇒O1 ⊲2 O2 for all
O1 and O2 inQ. Consider any O inQ, and any u in O such that u ∉C⊲1(O) =O∖⋃{O′ ⊆O ∶
O′ ⊲1 O}. Then u ∈⋃{O′ ⊆O ∶O′ ⊲1 O}, but since ⊲1⊆⊲2, then also u ∈⋃{O′ ⊆O ∶O′ ⊲2 O}.
Then u ∉C⊲2(O), so indeed C⊲1 ⊑C⊲2 .
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For the second statement, Proposition 5 guarantees that the same map is a bijection
between C̄ and S̄ . Since we have already shown that both f and its inverse f −1 preserve the
order, this completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 8. We show that infC′ satisfies the rationality axioms of Definition 4:
C1 Consider any C in C′ [always possible since C′ ≠∅] and any O in Q, then ∅ ⊂C(O) ⊆
infC′(O).
C2 Note that, for all C in C′, C({u,v}) = {v} whenever u ≺ v, implying that infC′({u,v}) =
⋃C∈C′C({u,v}) = {v}.
C3a Fix any O,O1,O2 inQ such that ⋃C∈C′C(O2) = infC′(O2) ⊆O2∖O1 and O1 ⊆O2 ⊆O.
This implies that for all C in C′, C(O2) ⊆ O2∖O1 and therefore also C(O) ⊆ O∖O1,
because C is coherent. So indeed infC′(O) =⋃C∈C′C(O) ⊆O∖O1.
C3b Fix any O,O1,O2 inQ such that infC′(O2) =⋃C∈C′C(O2) ⊆O1 and O ⊆O2∖O1. This
means that for all C in C′, C(O2) ⊆O1, and therefore also C(O2∖O) ⊆O1, because C
is coherent. So indeed infC′(O2∖O) =⋃C∈C′C(O2∖O) ⊆O1.
C4 Consider any C in C′, λ in R>0, u in V and O in Q, and derive from Proposition 3(i)
that λC(O)+ {u} =C(λO + {u}). Hence λ infC′(O)+ {u} = λ⋃C∈C′C(O)+ {u} =
⋃C∈C′(λC(O)+ {u}) = ⋃C∈C′C(λO + {u}) = infC′(λO + {u}), which implies that
infC′ satisfies axioms C4a and C4b. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider any set of coherent sets of desirable options D′ ⊆ D̄, and
its infimum infD′ =⋂D′, which is of course also a set of desirable options. We show that
infD′ is coherent, meaning that it satisfies the rationality axioms of Definition 7:
D1 Since 0 ∉D for all D in D′, also 0 ∉ infD′.
D2 Fix any u in V≻0, so u ∈D for all D in D′, implying that indeed u ∈ infD′.
D3 Consider any λ in R>0 and any u ∈ infD′, meaning that u ∈ D for all D in D′. Then
also λu ∈D for all D in D′, implying that indeed λu ∈ infD′.
D4 Consider any u,v ∈ infD′, meaning that u and v belong to all D in D′. Hence u+v ∈D
for all D in D′, implying that indeed u+v ∈ infD′.
Now, as a convex cone, V≻0 satisfies D3 and D4, and by definition it satisfies D1 and D2.
So V≻0 is coherent, and by Axiom D2 it is included in any other coherent set of desirable
options. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Let, for ease of notation, D′ ∶= posi(D∪{−u}). It is clear that D′
satisfies Axioms D2–D4, so we only need to prove that 0 ∉ D′. Assume ex absurdo that
0 ∈ D′. Since 0 ∉ D and 0 ≠ u, there must be v in D and λ in R>0 such that v+λ(−u) = 0,
implying that u = 1
λ
v ∈D [Axiom D3], a contradiction.
Next, consider any maximal coherent set of desirable options D and fix any option u in
V∖{0} such that −u ∉D. Assume ex absurdo that also u ∉D, then D′ ∶= posi(D∪{−u}) ⊃D
is a coherent set of desirable options by the first part, contradicting the maximality of D.
Conversely, consider any coherent set of desirable options D that satisfies Equation (5),
and any coherent set of desirable options D′ ⊇ D. Consider any u in D′ then clearly u ≠ 0
[Axiom D1], so we infer from (5) that u ∈D or −u ∈D. Assume ex absurdo that −u ∈D, then
also −u ∈D′, which together with u ∈D′ implies that 0 = u+(−u) ∈D′ [Axiom D4], which
contradicts the coherence of D′ [Axiom D1]. Hence u ∈D, which implies that D′ =D, so D
is indeed maximal. 
Proof of Proposition 11. We have to prove that the set {D̂ ∈ D̄ ∶ D ⊆ D̂} has a maximal
element. This will follow directly from Zorn’s Lemma if we can show that any chain K in
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this poset has a greatest element. It is a matter of straightforward verification of the axioms
to see that ⋃K is a coherent set of desirable options, so ⋃K is this greatest element.
Let us now establish the dual atomicity. By definition, D ⊆⋂D̂D , so we concentrate on
proving that ⋂D̂D ⊆D. Consider any u in ⋂D̂D , meaning that u ∈ D̂ for all D̂ ∈ D̂D . Assume
ex absurdo that u ∉ D, then −u ∈ posi(D ∪{−u}), and posi(D ∪{−u}) is a coherent set of
desirable options by Proposition 10. Consider any maximal coherent set of desirable options
D̂ that dominates this set [there is such a coherent maximal set by Proposition 11], then
also −u ∈ D̂ and therefore u ∉ D̂ [use Axioms D4 and D1]. But since the maximal D̂ also
dominates D, this is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 12. We first show that DC is coherent:
D1 Assume ex absurdo that 0 ∈DC , meaning that 0 ∉C({0}), contradicting the coherence
of C [Axiom C1].
D2 Consider any option u in V≻0, so 0 ≺ u. The coherence of C [Axiom C2] then implies
that {u} =C({0,u}), whence 0 ∉C({0,u}), implying that indeed u ∈DC .
D3 Consider any λ in R>0, and any u in DC , meaning that 0 ∉C({0,u}). Proposition 3(i)
with v = 0 then implies that 0 = λ0 ∉C({0,λu}), whence indeed λu ∈DC .
D4 Consider any u,v in D, meaning that 0 ∉C({0,u}) and 0 ∉C({0,v}). Proposition 3(i)
with µ = 1 then implies that u ∉C({u,u+v}) and v ∉C({v,u+v}), and consequently
that {0,u,v}∩C({0,u,v,u+v}) = ∅ [use version (3) of Axiom C3a three times with
O ∶= {0,u,v,u+ v}: once with O1 ∶= {0} and O2 ∶= {0,u}, once with O1 ∶= {u} and
O2 ∶= {u,u+ v}, and once with O1 ∶= {v} and O2 ∶= {v,u+ v}]. This implies that 0 ∉
C({0,u+v}) by version (4) [with O3 ∶= {0,u,v}, O2 ∶= {0,u,v,u+v} and O ∶= {u,v}]
of Axiom C3b, whence indeed u+v ∈DC .
We complete the proof by showing that C and DC are compatible: v ∉C({u,v})⇔ u−v ∈
DC for all u,v in V. For the direct implication, consider any u,v in V such that v ∉C({u,v}).
Proposition 3(i) with λ = 1 then guarantees that 0 ∉C({0,u− v}), implying that indeed
u−v ∈ DC . For the converse implication, consider any u,v in V such that u−v ∈ DC . Then
0 ∉C({0,u−v}), implying that indeed v ∉C({u,v}), by Proposition 3(i) with λ = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 13. The proof is structured as follows: we show (a) that CD is compat-
ible with D; (b) that CD is coherent; and (c) that CD ⊑C for all C ∈ C̄D .
(a) First, we show that CD is compatible with D: Consider any u,v in V then it follows
from the definition of CD that indeed
v ∉CD({u,v})⇔ (∃w ∈ {u,v})w−v ∈D⇔ (u−v ∈D or v−v ∈D)⇔ u−v ∈D,
where the last equivalence follows from 0 ∉D, because D is coherent [Axiom D1].
(b) Next, we show that CD is coherent:
C1 Consider any O in Q. Since ∣O∣ is finite and ½ is a strict partial order, we know
that there is at least one maximal element um for ½, meaning that (∀v ∈O)um /½ v,
or equivalently (∀v ∈O)v−um ∉D. Hence um ∈CD(O).
C2 Consider any u,v in V such that u ≺ v. Then 0 ≺ v− u, whence v− u ∈ D by
Axiom D2. So u ∉ CD({u,v}) by compatibility. Since we already know that
CD({u,v}) ≠∅, we must therefore have that indeed {v} =CD({u,v}).
(3) Consider any option sets O,O1,O2 inQ such that O1 ⊆O2 ⊆O and O1∩CD(O2) =
∅, implying that u ∉CD(O2) for all u in O1, or equivalently, that (∀u ∈O1)(∃v ∈
O2)v−u ∈D. Since O2 ⊆O, this implies that (∀u ∈O1)(∃v ∈O)v−u ∈D, or indeed
O1∩CD(O) =∅.
(4) Consider any option sets O,O1,O2 in Q such that O ⊆O1 and O1∩CD(O2) =∅,
implying that (∀u ∈O1)(∃v ∈O2)v−u ∈D. We need to prove that (∀u ∈O1)(∃v ∈
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O2∖O)v−u ∈D. We may assume without loss of generality that O = {v1, . . . ,vn}
with n in N0. Consider any u in O1, then we know that u1−u ∈D for some u1 in
O2. Then either u1 ∈O2∖O—in which case the proof is finished—or u1 ∈O, so
we may assume that u1 = v1 without loss of generality. But then, since O ⊆O1, we
know that u2−v1 ∈D for some u2 in O2. By coherence of D [Axiom D1], we know
that u2 ≠ v1, and therefore also that u2 in O2 ∖{v1}. Then either u2 ∈ O2 ∖O—
in which case the proof is finished—or u2 ∈ O ∖{v1}, so we may assume that
u2 = v2 without loss of generality. This tells us that v2 −v1 ∈ D. But then, again,
since O ⊆ O1, we know that u3 −v2 ∈ D for some u3 in O2. The coherence of D
[Axiom D4] then implies that also u3 −v1 = u3 −v2 +v2 −v1 ∈ D, and hence that
[use Axiom D1 twice] u3 ∉ {v1,v2}, so we know that u3 in O2 ∖{v1,v2}. When
we proceed in this way, we are guaranteed to find, after k ≤ n+1 steps, some uk in
O2∖O such that uk −u ∈D.
C4 Consider any O1,O2 in Q such that O1 ⊆CD(O2), meaning that (∀u ∈O1)(∀v ∈
O2)v−u ∉D.
C4a It follows that (∀u ∈ O1)(∀v ∈ O2)λv−λu ∉ D for any λ in R>0, whence
indeed λO1 ⊆CD(λO2).
C4b Also (∀u ∈O1)(∀v ∈O2)(v+w)−(u+w) ∉D for any w in V, whence indeed
O1+{w} ⊆CD(O2+{w}).
(c) Finally, we show that CD ⊑ C for all C ∈ C̄D : Consider any C in C̄D and O in Q, then
we have to prove that C(O) ⊆CD(O). Consider any u in O and assume that u ∉CD(O).
Then v−u ∈ D for some v in O, implying that u ∉C({u,v}) because C is compatible
with D. The coherence of C [version (3) of Axiom C3a with Õ1 ∶= {u}, Õ2 ∶= {u,v}
and Õ ∶=O] then implies that also u ∉C(O). 
Proof of Proposition 14. Because Dv ∈ D̄, we have that CDv is a coherent choice function
by Proposition 13, and it then follows that Cv ⊑ CDv . We show that CDv ⊑ Cv, or in other
words, that
(∀O ∈Q)(∀u ∈O)u ∉CDv(O)⇒ u ∉Cv(O)
Fix any O in Q and any u in O such that u ∉ CDv(O), meaning that u ≺ v for some v
in O by the definition of CDv . Then, due to Axiom C2, we find that u ∉C({u,v}), and
using version (3) of Axiom C3a [with Õ1 ∶= {u}, Õ2 ∶= {u,v} and Õ ∶= O] we infer that
u ∉Cv(O). 
Proof of Proposition 15. Recall in advance that infC′ is a coherent choice function by
Proposition 8, and that inf{DC ∶C ∈C′} is a coherent set of desirable options by Proposition 9.
For the first statement, consider any u in V, and observe that
u ∈DinfC′⇔ 0 ∉ infC′({0,u})⇔ 0 ∉ ⋃
C∈C′
C({0,u})
⇔ (∀C ∈ C′)0 ∉C({0,u})
⇔ (∀C ∈ C′)u ∈DC
⇔ u ∈⋂{DC ∶C ∈ C′} = inf{DC ∶C ∈ C′},
where the first and fourth equivalences follow from Proposition 12.
For the second statement, fix any O in Q and u in V such that u ∈ infC′(O). Then
u ∈C(O) for some C in C′, from which we infer that (∃C ∈ C′)(∀v ∈O)u ∈C({u,v}), by an
immediate application of version (3) [use the contraposition with Õ1 ∶= {u}, Õ2 ∶= {u,v}
and Õ ∶=O] of Axiom C3a. By exchanging the quantifiers, we infer as an implication that
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(∀v ∈O)(∃C ∈ C′)u ∈C({u,v}). Now recall that
u ∈C({u,v})⇔ 0 ∈C({0,v−u}) by Axiom C4b
⇔ v−u ∉DC by Proposition 12.
This implies that (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉⋂{DC ∶C ∈ C′}, which is equivalent to u ∈Cinf{DC ∶C∈C′}(O),
by Proposition 13. The rest of the proof is now immediate. 
Proof of Proposition 16. Recall in advance that inf{CD ∶D ∈D′} is a coherent choice func-
tion by Propositions 8 and 13, and that infD′ is a coherent set of desirable options by
Proposition 9.
For the first statement, consider any u in V and observe that:
u ∈Dinf{CD ∶D∈D′}⇔ 0 ∉ (inf{CD ∶D ∈D
′})({0,u}) = ⋃
D∈D′
CD({0,u}) by Pr. 12
⇔ (∀D ∈D′)0 ∉CD({0,u})
⇔ (∀D ∈D′)(∃v ∈ {0,u})v ∈D by Pr. 13
⇔ (∀D ∈D′)u ∈D by Ax. D1
⇔ u ∈ infD′.
For the second statement, let C′ ∶= {CD ∶D ∈D′}, then we infer from the first statement that
{DC ∶C ∈ C′} =D′. Now, use the second statement in Proposition 15. 
Proof of Corollary 17. It is an immediate consequence of Propositions 16 and 15, by letting
D′ ∶= {D} and C′ ∶= {C}. 
Proof of Proposition 18. Immediate consequence of Propositions 8 and 13. 
Proof of Proposition 19. Consider any u in V, then
u ∈DCM
D′
⇔ 0 ∉CMD′({0,u}) by Proposition 12
⇔ (∀D̂ ∈ D̂D′)0 ∉CD̂({0,u}) by Definition 11
⇔ (∀D̂ ∈ D̂D′)u ∈ D̂ by Proposition 12
⇔ u ∈⋂D̂D′⇔ u ∈D′ by Proposition 11,
proving the first statement. It then follows from Proposition 12 that D′ is compatible with
CMD′ , and therefore from Proposition 13 that CD′ = inf C̄D′ ⊑CMD′ . 
Proof of Proposition 20. By Proposition 13, it suffices to prove (a) that Dp is coherent; and
(b) that Cp =CDp .
For (a), that Axiom D1 holds, follows from 0 ∉ V≻0 and Ep(0) = 0. Axiom D2 holds
by definition. For Axiom D3, consider any u in Dp and real λ in R>0, then 0 ≺ u and
therefore 0 ≺ λu, or Ep(u) > 0 and therefore Ep(λu) = λEp(u) > 0, whence indeed λu ∈Dp .
For Axiom D4, consider any u,v in Dp , then there are three possibilities. The first is
that both u and v belong to V≻0, and therefore also u+ v ∈ V≻0. The second is that both
Ep(u) > 0 and Ep(v) > 0, and therefore also Ep(u+v) = Ep(u)+Ep(v) > 0. And the third
is that, without loss of generality, Ep(u) > 0 and v ∈ V≻0, whence Ep(v) ≥ 0 and therefore
Ep(u+v) = Ep(u)+Ep(v) > 0. In all cases therefore indeed u+v ∈Dp .
For (b), consider any O in Q, use Equation (8) to find that CDp (O) = {u ∈ O ∶ (∀v ∈
O)v−u ∉ Dp} and Equation (10) to find that v−u ∉ Dp ⇔ (v−u ∉ V≻0 and Ep(v−u) ≤ 0).
It then follows from Equation (11) that indeed Cp(O) =CDp (O). 
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Proof of Proposition 21. We infer from Definition 12 and Proposition 20 that
CEK(O) = ⋃
p∈K
CDp (O) = ⋃
p∈K
{u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉Dp},
where the last equality follows from Proposition 13. Now
(∀v ∈O)v−u ∉Dp ⇔ (∀v ∈O)(u⊀ v and Ep(v−u) ≤ 0)
⇔ u ∈Cv(O) and (∀v ∈O)Ep(v−u) ≤ 0),




{u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)Ep(v−u) ≤ 0}∩Cv(O)
= {u ∈O ∶ (∃p ∈K)(∀v ∈O)Ep(v) ≤ Ep(u)}∩Cv(O). 
Proof of Proposition 22. We consider any p in K and prove that CDp ⊑ CMD̂{p} . The proof
then follows by taking the infimum infp∈K over p ∈ K on both sides of this inequality.
Consider any O in Q and assume that u ∈CMD̂{p}(O), so there is some D̂ in D̂{p} such that
u ∈CD̂(O), or equivalently, (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉ D̂. Hence (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉Dp , because Dp ⊆ D̂,
and therefore indeed u ∈CDp (O). 
Proof of Proposition 23. To see that ⪯ is reflexive, use w = 0 in Equation (13). For antisym-
metry, consider any [u],[v] in V/I such that [u] ⪯ [v] and [v] ⪯ [u], and therefore u ⪯ v+w
and v ⪯ u+w′ for some w,w′ ∈ I. This implies, by repeatedly applying Equation (1) and
the transitivity of the vector ordering on V that w+w′ ⪰ 0. Now, by Axiom I4, w+w′ ∈ I,
and therefore, by Axiom I2, w+w′ = 0, implying that u ⪯ v+w and v ⪯ u−w, and therefore
also v+w ⪯ u, for some w ∈ I. Hence indeed u = v+w and therefore [u] = [v], by the an-
tisymmetry of the vector ordering on V. For transitivity, consider any [u],[v],[w] in V/I
such that [u] ⪯ [v] and [v] ⪯ [w], and therefore u ⪯ v+v′ and v ⪯ w+w′ for some v′,w′ ∈ I.
Then v+v′ ⪯ w+w′+v′ by Equation (1), whence also u ⪯ w+w′+v′ by transitivity of the
vector ordering on V. By coherence [Axiom I4] also v′+w′ ∈ I, whence indeed [u] ⪯ [w] by
Equation (13).
Next, we prove that ⪯ satisfies Eqs. (1) and (2). Consider any [u1],[u2] in V/I such that
[u1] ⪯ [u2], implying that u1 ⪯ u2+u′2 for some u′2 ∈ I. For (1), consider any v in V, then also
u1 +v ⪯ u2 +v+u′2, implying that indeed [u1]+ [v] ⪯ [u2]+ [v]. The converse implication
follows analogously, by adding −v rather than v. For (2), consider any λ in R>0, then also
λu1 ⪯ λu2 +λu′2, implying that indeed λ [u1] ⪯ λ [u2] because λu′2 ∈ I by Axiom I3. The
converse implication follows analogously, by multiplying with 1
λ
rather than λ .
We turn to the second statement. For necessity, consider u,v in V such that [u] ≺ [v],
so [u] ≠ [v] and u ⪯ v+w for some w in I. [u] ≠ [v] implies that u ≠ v+w for all w in I.
Taken together with u ⪯ v+w for some w, this implies that indeed u ≺ v+w for some w.
For sufficiency, consider u,v in V such that u ≺ v+w for some w in I. Assume ex absurdo
that [u]⊀ [v], meaning that [u] = [v] or u â v+w for all w in I. The latter possibility is
incompatible with the assumption that u ≺ v+w for some w in I, leaving only the first
possibility, which is equivalent to u = v+w′ for some w′ in I. Then v+w′ ≺ v+w, implying
that 0 ≺ w−w′ by Equation (1). This contradicts the coherence of I [Axiom I2] because
w−w′ is an element of I by Axiom I4. 
Proof of Proposition 24. For necessity, observe that
D+ I = {u+v ∶ u ∈D and v ∈ I} =⋃{{u}+ I ∶ u ∈D} =⋃{[u] ∶ u ∈D} =⋃D/I,
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and that compatibility with I guarantees that D+ I =D. For sufficiency, assume that there is
some set of desirable options D′ ⊆ V/I such that D = {u ∶ [u] ∈D′}. Consider any u in D and
any v in I = [0], then u+ v ∈ [u]+ [0] = [u+0] = [u], and therefore indeed u+ v ∈ D. Then
also D/I = {[u] ∶ u ∈D} = {[u] ∶ [u] ∈D′} =D′. 
Proof of Proposition 25. For the direct implication, assume that D ⊆ V is coherent. We
show that D/I = {[u] ∶ u ∈ D} ⊆ V/I satisfies the Axioms D1–D4. For Axiom D1, assume
ex absurdo that [0] ∈D/I, implying that u ∈D for some u in [0] = I, but then u ∈D∩ I and
hence D ∩ I is non-empty, a contradiction. For Axiom D2, consider any [u] in V/I such
that [0] ≺ [u], meaning that 0 ≺ u+w for some w in I. Then u+w ∈ D for some w in I,
by coherence of D [Axiom D2], implying that [u] = [u]+ I = [u]+ [w] = [u+w] ∈D/I. For
Axiom D3, assume that [u] ∈ D/I, and consider any λ in R>0. Then u ∈ D, implying that
λu ∈D by coherence of D [Axiom D3], whence λ [u] = [λu] ∈D/I. For Axiom D4, assume
that [u],[v] ∈ D/I, implying that u,v ∈ D. Then u+ v ∈ D by coherence of D [Axiom D4],
whence [u]+ [v] = [u+v] ∈D/I.
For the converse implication, assume that D/I ⊆ V/I is coherent. We show that D = {u ∶
[u] ∈D/I} ⊆ V satisfies the Axioms D1–D4. For Axiom D1, infer that 0 ∉D since [0] ∉D/I
by coherence of D/I [Axiom D1]. For Axiom D2, consider any u in V such that 0 ≺ u. Then
[0]≺ [u] by taking for example w= 0 in Proposition 23, implying that [u] ∈D/I by coherence
of D/I [Axiom D2], whence u ∈D. For Axiom D3, assume that u ∈D, and consider any λ
in R>0. Then [u] ∈D/I, implying that λ [u] = [λu] ∈D/I by coherence of D/I [Axiom D3],
whence λu ∈ D. For Axiom D4, assume that u,v ∈ D, implying that [u],[v] ∈ D/I. Then
[u]+ [v] ∈D/I by coherence of D/I [Axiom D4], implying that u+v ∈D. 
Proof of Proposition 26. For the first statement, assume that C is compatible with I, that is,
there is some C′ on Q(V/I) such that C(O) ∶= {u ∈ O ∶ [u] ∈C′(O/I)} for all O in Q(V).
Consider any O1 and O2 in Q(V). Infer that
O1 ⊲C O2⇔O1∩C(O1∪O2) =∅⇔O1∩{u ∈O1∪O2 ∶ [u] ∈C′((O1∪O2)/I)} =∅
⇔O1/I∩C′((O1∪O2)/I) =∅
⇔O1/I ⊲C′ O2/I.
This shows that the representing choice relation is derived from the representing choice
function.
For the second statement, assume that ⊲ is compatible with I, that is, there is some ⊲′ on
Q(V/I) such that O1 ⊲ O2⇔O1/I ⊲′ O2/I for all O1 and O2 in Q(V). Consider any O in
Q(V). Then C⊲(O) =O∖⋃{O′ ⊆O ∶O′ ⊲ O} =O∖⋃{O′ ⊆O ∶O′/I ⊲′ O/I}. Infer that
u ∈C⊲(O)⇔ u ∈O and u ∉⋃{O′ ⊆O ∶O′/I ⊲′ O/I}
⇔ u ∈O and [u] ∉⋃{Õ ⊆O/I ∶ Õ ⊲′ O/I}
⇔ u ∈O and [u] ∈O/I∖⋃{Õ ⊆O/I ∶ Õ ⊲′ O/I}
⇔ u ∈O and [u] ∈C⊲′(O/I),
whence C⊲ is indeed compatible with I, with representing choice function C⊲′ . 
Proof of Proposition 27. Let C′ be any representing choice function, and consider any O in
Q(V), then
C(O)/I = {[u] ∶ u ∈C(O)} = {[u] ∶ u ∈O,[u] ∈C′(O/I)} =O/I∩C′(O/I) =C′(O/I). 
Lemma 36. Given any two option sets O1,O2 in Q(V), then O2/I∖O1/I ⊆ (O2∖O1)/I.
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Proof. Consider any ũ in O2/I∖O1/I, then ũ = [v2] for some v2 in O2 and ũ ≠ [v1] for all
v1 in O1, implying that indeed ũ = [v2] for some v2 in O2∖O1. 
Lemma 37. For any choice function C on Q(V) that is compatible with a coherent set
of indifferent options I, and any option set O in Q(V), we have that (O∖C(O))/I =
O/I∖C/I(O/I).
Proof. Consider any ũ in V/I, then
ũ ∈ (O∖C(O))/I⇔ (∃v ∈O∖C(O))ũ = [v]
⇔ (∃v ∈O)(ũ = [v] and v ∉C(O))
⇔ (∃v ∈O)(ũ = [v] and [v] ∉C/I(O/I)) by Proposition 27
⇔ (∃v ∈O)(ũ = [v] and ũ ∉C/I(O/I))
⇔ ũ ∉C/I(O/I) and (∃v ∈O)ũ = [v]
⇔ ũ ∈O/I∖C/I(O/I),
whence indeed (O∖C(O))/I =O/I∖C/I(O/I). 
Lemma 38. For any choice function C on Q(V) that is compatible with a coherent set of
indifferent options I, and any option sets O1,O2 in Q(V) such that O1 ⊆O2, we have that
O1∩C(O2) =∅⇔O1/I∩C/I(O2/I) =∅.
Proof. First, assume that O1 ∩C(O2) ≠ ∅, and consider any v in O1 ∩C(O2). Then [v] ∈
O1/I and [v] ∈C(O2)/I =C/I(O2/I), by Proposition 27. Conversely, assume that O1/I∩
C/I(O2/I) ≠∅, and consider any ũ in O1/I∩C/I(O2/I). Then there is some v in O1 such
that ũ = [v], and we infer from Proposition 27 that ũ ∈C(O2)/I, so also v ∈C(O2). 
Lemma 39. For all Õ in Q(V/I), there is some O in Q(V) such that O/I = Õ.
Proof. For every element ũ in the finite set Õ, we take some vector u in V such that [u] = ũ,
and collect those vectors in an option set O. Then O ∈Q(V) because it is a finite subset of
V, and O/I = {[u] ∶ u ∈O} = Õ. 
Proof of Proposition 28. For the direct implication, assume that C is coherent. We show
that C/I satisfies Axioms C1–C4b.
For Axiom C1, assume ex absurdo that C/I(Õ) = ∅ for some Õ in Q(V/I). Consider
any option set O in Q(V) such that O/I = Õ, then C(O) = {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈C/I(Õ)} = {u ∈O ∶
[u] ∈∅} =∅, contradicting the coherence of C [Axiom C1].
For Axiom C2, consider [u],[v] in V/I such that [u]≺ [v], meaning that u≺ v+w for some
w in I, by Proposition 23. Then {v+w} =C({u,v+w}) by coherence of C [Axiom C2], so
{[v]} = {[v+w]} =C/I({[u],[v+w]}) =C/I({[u],[v]}), where the first and last equalities
hold because w belongs to I.
For version (3) of Axiom C3a, consider any option sets Õ1,Õ2,Õ in Q(V/I) such that
Õ1∩C/I(Õ2) =∅ and Õ1 ⊆ Õ2 ⊆ Õ. Consider any option set O in Q(V) such that O/I = Õ,
and define the option sets O2 ∶= {u ∈ O ∶ [u] ∈ Õ2} ∈Q(V) and O1 ∶= {u ∈ O2 ∶ [u] ∈ Õ1} ∈
Q(V). Then O1 ⊆ O2 ⊆ O, O2/I = {[v] ∶ v ∈ O2} = {[v] ∶ v ∈ O and [v] ∈ Õ2} = O/I∩{[v] ∶
[v] ∈ Õ2} = Õ ∩ Õ2 = Õ2 and, similarly, O1/I = {[v] ∶ v ∈ O2 and [v] ∈ Õ1} = O2/I ∩ Õ1 =
Õ2 ∩ Õ1 = Õ1, so we infer from Lemma 38 that O1 ∩C(O2) = ∅, and therefore also that
O1 ∩C(O) = ∅ by coherence of C [version (3) of Axiom C3a]. Because Õ = O/I, we
conclude from Lemma 38 that indeed Õ1∩C/I(Õ) =∅.
For version (4) of Axiom C3b, consider any option sets Õ1,Õ2,Õ in Q(V/I) such that
Õ1 ∩C/I(Õ2) = ∅ and Õ ⊆ Õ1. Let Õ′1 ∶= Õ1 ∩ Õ2 and Õ′′1 ∶= Õ1 ∖ Õ2, then Õ = Õ′ ∪ Õ′′,
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and Õ′ ⊆ Õ′1 ⊆ Õ2. So the assumption Õ1 ∩C/I(Õ2) = ∅ implies that Õ′1 ∩C/I(Õ2) = ∅.
Introduce the option sets O′,O′1,O2 in Q(V) as follows: O2 is any option set such that
O2/I = Õ2, O′1 ∶= {u ∈ O2 ∶ [u] ∈ Õ′1} and O′ ∶= {u ∈ O′1 ∶ [u] ∈ Õ′} = {u ∈ O2 ∶ [u] ∈ Õ′}, then
O′ ⊆ O′1 ⊆ O2. Also, O′1/I = Õ′1, O′/I = Õ′, and Õ′1 ∩C/I(Õ2) = ∅ allows us to infer that
O′1 ∩C(O2) = ∅, using Lemma 38. The coherence of C [version (4) of Axiom C3b] then
implies that O′1 ∩C(O2 ∖O′) = ∅, and therefore also (O′1 ∖O′)∩C(O2 ∖O′) = ∅. This
implies that O′1∖O′ ⊆ (O2∖O′)∖C(O2∖O′), because O′1∖O′ ⊆O2∖O′. By Equation (14)





The reasoning is similar for both equalities, and therefore we restrict ourselves here
to proving the first one; the second one can be proved by replacing O2 by O′1. That
(O′1∖O′)/I ⊇O′1/I∖O′/I follows from Lemma 36. To show that (O′1∖O′)/I ⊆O′1/I∖O′/I,
consider any ũ in (O′1∖O′)/I, meaning that ũ = [v1] for some v in O′1 ∖O′. That implies
already that ũ ∈ O′1/I. Assume ex absurdo that ũ ∈ O′/I = Õ′, and consider any v ∈ O′1
such that [v] = ũ, then also v ∈ O2 and [v] ∈ Õ′, and therefore v ∈ O′. But this implies that
ũ ∉ (O′1∖O′)/I, a contradiction. So we conclude that (O′1∖O′)/I = O′1/I∖O′/I and that
(O2∖O′)/I =O2/I∖O′/I, implying that
Õ′1∖ Õ′ =O′1/I∖O′/I ⊆ (O2/I∖O′/I)∖C/I(O2/I∖O′/I) = (Õ2∖ Õ′)∖C/I(Õ2∖ Õ′),
or equivalently, (Õ′1∖Õ′)∩C/I(Õ2∖Õ′) =∅. Since Õ′∩C/I(Õ2∖Õ′) =∅, this also implies
that Õ′1∩C/I(Õ2∖ Õ′) =∅. Since Õ2∖ Õ′ = Õ2∖ Õ and Õ1∩ Õ2 = Õ′1, this indeed leads to
∅ = Õ1∩ Õ2∩C/I(Õ2∖ Õ) = Õ1∩C/I(Õ2∖ Õ).
For Axioms C4a and C4b, consider any Õ1,Õ2 in Q(V/I) such that Õ1 ⊆ C/I(Õ2),
and consider any λ in R>0 and ũ in V/I. Consider any option set O2 in Q(V) such that
O2/I = Õ2, let O1 ∶= {u ∈ O2 ∶ [u] ∈ Õ1} ∈Q(V), and consider any u in V such that [u] = ũ.
We first prove that then O1 ⊆C(O2). Indeed, consider any v ∈ O1, meaning that v ∈ O2
and [v] ∈ Õ1, and therefore also [v] ∈C/I(Õ2). Proposition 27 then guarantees that indeed
u ∈C(O2). We now infer from the coherence of C [Axioms C4a and C4b] that λO1 ⊆C(λO2)
and O1 + {u} ⊆ C(O2 + {u}). Hence indeed λ Õ1 = λO1/I = (λO1)/I ⊆ C/I((λO2)/I) =
C/I(λO2/I)=C/I(λ Õ2) and Õ1+{ũ}=O1/I+{[u]}= (O1+{u})/I ⊆C/I((O2+{u})/I)=
C/I(O2/I + {ũ}) = C/I(Õ2 + {ũ}), where the inclusions follow from Equation (14) and
Proposition 27.
For the converse implication, assume that C/I is coherent. We show that C satisfies
Axioms C1–C4b.
For Axiom C1, consider any O in Q(V) and assume ex absurdo that C(O) =∅. Then
it follows from Proposition 27 that C/I(O/I) =C(O)/I = ∅/I = ∅, which contradicts the
coherence of C/I [Axiom C1].
For Axiom C2, consider any u,v in V such that u ≺ v. Then [u] ≺ [v] by letting for
example w = 0 in Proposition 23. The coherence of C/I [Axiom C2] then guarantees that
{[v]} =C/I({[u],[v]}), implying that {v} =C({u,v}), by Proposition 27.
For version (3) of Axiom C3a, consider any option sets O,O1,O2 in Q(V) such that
O1 ⊆ O2 ⊆ O and O1∩C(O2) =∅. Then Lemma 38 guarantees that O1/I∩C/I(O2/I) =∅.
Because O2 ⊆O, we have by Equation (14) that O2/I ⊆O/I, whence O1/I∩C/I(O/I) =∅
by coherence of C/I [version (3) of Axiom C3a]. Using Lemma 38 again, we infer that
indeed O1∩C(O) =∅.
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For version (4) of Axiom C3b, consider any option sets O,O1,O2 in Q(V) such that
O ⊆O1 and O1∩C(O2) =∅. We may assume without loss of generality that O1 ⊆O2 [if not,
replace O1 by O1∩O2 and O by O∩O2]. Let
O1 ∶= {u ∈O2 ∶ [u] ∈O1/I} ⊇O1 and Ǒ ∶= {u ∈O1 ∶ [u]∩O1 ⊆O},
then O1/I = O1/I. Because C is compatible with I, we infer from Lemma 38 that the
statements O1∩C(O2) =∅, O1∩C(O2) =∅ and O1/I∩C/I(O2/I) =∅ are equivalent, and
therefore all hold. Observe that also Ǒ ⊆O1 ⊆O2, implying that Ǒ/I ⊆O1/I ⊆O2/I by Equa-
tion (14). That Ǒ/I ⊆O1/I and O1/I∩C/I(O2/I) =∅ implies, together with the coherence
of C/I [version (4) of Axiom C3b], that O1/I∩C/I(O2/I∖ Ǒ/I) =∅, and therefore also that
(O1/I∖ Ǒ/I)∩C/I(O2/I∖ Ǒ/I) =∅.
We now prove that O2/I∖ Ǒ/I ⊆ (O2∖O)/I. Consider any ũ in O2/I∖ Ǒ/I, and assume
ex absurdo that ũ ∉ (O2∖O)/I, or in other words, that (∀w ∈ O2)(w ∉ O ⇒ ũ ≠ [w]), or
equivalently, (∀w ∈O2)(ũ= [w]⇒w ∈O). This implies that ũ∩O2 ⊆O, from which we infer
on the one hand that ũ∩O1 ⊆O since O1 ⊆O2 by assumption. On the other hand, we infer
that (ũ∩O2)/I ⊆O/I by Equation (14), whence ũ ∈O/I because ũ ∈O2/I by assumption, and
therefore also ũ ∈O1/I =O1/I. Both observations together imply that ũ ∈ Ǒ/I, a contradiction
with ũ ∈ O2/I∖ Ǒ/I. Coherence of C/I [version (3) of Axiom C3a; with Õ1 ∶= O1/I∖ Ǒ/I,
Õ2 ∶=O2/I∖Ǒ/I and Õ ∶= (O2∖O)/I] now implies that (O1/I∖Ǒ/I)∩C/I((O2∖O)/I)=∅.
We next prove that (O1∖O)/I ⊆ O1/I∖ Ǒ/I. Consider any ũ in (O1∖O)/I, so ũ = [v]
for some v in O1 ∖O. This already implies that ũ ∈ O1/I. Assume ex absurdo that ũ ∉
O1/I∖ Ǒ/I, so ũ ∈ Ǒ/I, whence ũ∩O1 ⊆ O. But we know that v ∈ O1 and v ∈ ũ, so v ∈ O, a
contradiction. We conclude form all this that (O1∖O)/I∩C/I((O2∖O)/I) = ∅, whence
O1 ∖O ∩C(O2 ∖O) = ∅ by Lemma 38, and because C(O2 ∖O) ⊆ O2 ∖O, indeed that
O1∩C(O2∖O) =∅.
For Axioms C4a and C4b, consider any O1,O2 in Q(V) such that O1 ⊆C(O2), and
consider any λ in R>0 and ũ in V. Then O1/I ⊆C/I(O2/I) by Equation (14) and Proposi-
tion 27, implying that (λO1)/I = λO1/I ⊆C/I(λO2/I) =C/I((λO2)/I) and (O1+{u})/I =
O1/I+{[u]} ⊆C/I(O2/I+{[u]}) =C/I((O2+{u})/I), where the inclusions follow from
the coherence of C/I [Axioms C4a and C4b respectively]. This then implies that indeed
λO1 ⊆C(λO2) and O1+{u} ⊆C(O2+{u}). 
Proof of Proposition 29. Let us denote C ∶= inf{Ci ∶ i ∈ I}, then C is a coherent choice
function by Proposition 8. We show that it is compatible with I. By assumption, and using
Proposition 27, we have for all i ∈ I that
Ci(O) = {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈Ci/I(O/I)} for all O ∈Q(V).





{u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈Ci/I(O/I)}
= {u ∈O ∶ (∃i ∈ I)[u] ∈Ci/I(O/I)}
= {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈⋃
i∈I
Ci/I(O/I)}
= {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈ (inf{Ci/I ∶ i ∈ I})(O/I)},
and the stated result now follows from Propositions 8 and 27. 
Lemma 40. Given O1 and O2 in Q such that O1 ⊆O2, we have that
O1 ⊆ {u ∈O2 ∶ [u] ∈O1/I}.
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Proof. Consider any v in O1. Then v ∈O2 because O1 ⊆O2, and [v] ∈O1/I by the definition
of the quotient space, whence v ∈ {u ∈O2 ∶ [u] ∈O1/I}. 
Proof of Proposition 30. We first prove that ≈C is an equivalence relation. The reflexivity
and symmetry are an immediate consequence of the definition (15). To prove transitivity,
consider any u,v,w in V and assume that u ≈C v and v ≈C w. Consider any O in Q and
assume that {u,w} ⊆O and u ∈C(O). Then it suffices to prove that also w ∈C(O). Assume
ex absurdo that w ∉C(O), then we infer from Axiom C3a that also w ∉C(O∪{v}). Since
v ≈C w, we infer from Equation (15) that then v ∉C(O∪{v}), and similarly, since u ≈C v, that
u ∉C(O∪{v}), so {u,v} ⊆ (O∪{v})∖C(O∪{v}). Axiom C3b then tells us that u ∉C(O),
a contradiction.
To prove (ii), assume that u ≈C v, and consider any O ∈Q such that {u+w,v+w} ⊆O and
u+w ∈C(O). Then it suffices to prove that also v+w ∈C(O). It follows from u+w ∈C(O)
and Axiom C4b that u ∈C(O−{w}). Since u ≈C v, we infer from Equation (15) that then
also v ∈C(O−{w}), whence, again by Axiom C4b, indeed v+w ∈C(O).
To prove (i), assume that u ≈C v. We first prove that then also −u ≈C −v. Indeed, by
applying (ii) with w ∶= −u−v, we find that −v ≈C −u. Now use the symmetry of ≈C . Next,
consider any O ∈Q such that {λu,λv} ⊆ O and λu ∈C(O). Then it suffices to prove that
also λv ∈C(O). The proof is trivial if λ = 0. Because we have just proved that both u ≈C v
and −u ≈C −v, we may now assume without loss of generality that λ > 0. It follows from
λu ∈C(O) and Axiom C4a that u ∈C( 1λ O). Since u ≈C v, we infer from Equation (15) that
then also v ∈C( 1
λ
O), whence, again by Axiom C4a, indeed λv ∈C(O).
We complete the proof by showing that IC is a coherent set of indifferent options. To
prove I1, simply observe that 0 ≈C 0 by reflexivity of ≈C . To prove I2, it suffices to consider
any u ∈ V≻0, due to (i). It follows from Axiom C2 that both 0 ∉C({0,u}) and u ∈C({0,u}),
so we infer from Equation (15) that 0 /≈C u, whence indeed u ∉ IC . To prove I3, simply use (i).
To prove I4, simply use (ii) and the transitivity of ≈C . 
Proof of Proposition 31. For necessity, assume that C is compatible with I, and hence
(∀O ∈Q)C(O) = {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈C(O)/I}.
We need to prove that I ⊆ IC , so consider any u in I and any O ⊇ {0,u} in Q such that
u ∈C(O) [There always is such an O, for instance O ∶= {0,u}, because u ∈ I and there-
fore [u] ∈C/I({[u]}) =C/I({0,u}/I) =C({0,u})/I, by compatibility]. Then [u] ∈C(O)/I
and because [u] = [0], we find that [0] ∈C(O)/I, so 0 ∈C(O). Hence indeed u ≈C 0, by
Equation (15).
For sufficiency, assume that I is a linear subspace of IC , so I ⊆ IC , then we need to prove
that C is compatible with I. In other words, if we consider any O in Q and any u ∈O such
that [u] ∈C(O)/I, then we must prove that u ∈C(O). [u] ∈C(O)/I means that there is some
v ∈C(O) such that u− v ∈ I, and therefore, by assumption, u ≈C v. Since {u,v} ⊆ O and
v ∈C(O), we infer from Equation (15) that indeed u ∈C(O). 
Proof of Lemma 32. Fix u and v in V.
For the direct implication, assume that the left-hand side holds. We first prove that this
implies that both u−v ∉D and v−u ∉D. Indeed, consider the left-hand side for the particular
choice O ∶= {u,v}, leading to {0,v−u}∩D ≠∅⇔ {0,u−v}∩D ≠∅, or equivalently, v−u ∈
D⇔ u−v ∈ D, because 0 ∉ D by Axiom D1. So, if we had that u−v ∈ D or v−u ∈ D, this
would imply that both u− v and v−u would elements of D, and therefore also their sum
0 = u−v+v−u ∈D by Axiom D4. This contradicts Axiom D1.
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Next, consider any w in V such that w ∉ {u,v}, and consider the left-hand side for
the particular choice O ∶= {u,v,w}. Then O ⊇ {u,v} and therefore O − {u}∩D ≠ ∅⇔
O−{v}∩D ≠∅, which can rewritten as {0,v−u,w−u}∩D ≠∅⇔ {u−v,0,w−v}∩D ≠∅.
But 0 ∉D by Axiom D1, whence {v−u,w−u}∩D ≠∅⇔ {u−v,w−v}∩D ≠∅. But, since
we have seen above that neither u− v ∈ D nor v−u ∈ D, this can in turn be rewritten as
w− u ∉ D ⇔ w− v ∉ D. This tells us that w ∈ D + {u}⇔ w ∈ D + {v} for all w in V, and
therefore indeed D+{u} =D+{v}.
For the converse implication, assume that D+{u} =D+{v}. This immediately allows us
to infer that u−v ∉D and v−u ∉D. Consider any O ⊇ {u,v}. If O = {u,v} then O−{u}∩D =∅
and O−{v}∩D =∅. Let n ∶= ∣O∣−2 and assume therefore that n ≥ 1. Label the elements of
O∖{u,v} as w1, . . . , wn, without loss of generality. Then O = {u,v,w1, . . . ,wn}. Infer the
following equivalences:
O−{u}∩D ≠∅⇔ {0,v−u,w1−u, . . . ,wn−u}∩D ≠∅
⇔ {w1−u, . . . ,wn−u}∩D ≠∅
⇔ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})wi−u ∈D
⇔ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})wi ∈D+{u} =D+{v}
⇔ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})wi−v ∈D⇔O−{v}∩D ≠∅,
where the second equivalence follows from the fact that 0 ∉ D [see Axiom D1] and our
earlier observation that v−u ∉D. 
Proof of Proposition 33. We begin with the first statement. Consider any coherent choice
function C that is compatible with I. We must prove that DC + I ⊆DC . Observe that for any
w in V:
w ∈DC ⇔ 0 ∉C({0,w})⇔ [0] ∉C/I({[0],[w]})
⇔ [w] ∈DC/I, (17)
where the first equivalence follows from Proposition 12 and the second from the compati-
bility of C with I. So, consider any v in DC and any u in I, then [0] ∉C/I({[0],[v]}) and
[u] = [0] = I, implying that [v+u] = [v]+[u] = [v]+ I = [v]+[0] = [v+0] = [v], and therefore
[0] ∉C/I({[0],[v+u]}), implying that indeed v+u ∈DC . The last statement follows directly
from Equation (17).
We turn now towards the second statement. Consider any coherent set of indifferent
options I and any coherent set of desirable options D such that D+ I ⊆ D. We must prove
that CD(O) = {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈CD/I(O/I)} for all O inQ(V). Due to Proposition 13, we know
that CD(O) = {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)v−u ∉D} for all O in Q(V), whence, by Proposition 24,
CD(O) = {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)[v]− [u] ∉ {[w] ∶w ∈D}}
= {u ∈O ∶ (∀v ∈O)[v]− [u] ∉D/I}
= {u ∈O ∶ (∀[v] ∈O/I)[v]− [u] ∉D/I}
= {u ∈O ∶ [u] ∈CD/I(O/I)},
for all O in Q(V), because CD/I(O/I) = {ũ ∈ O/I ∶ (∀ṽ ∈ O/I)ṽ− ũ ∉ D/I} for all O/I in
Q(V/I). The fact that CD/I =CD/I now follows from Proposition 27. 
Proof of Proposition 34. That the transformation invP is linear, is immediate from its
definition in Equation (16).
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To prove (i), observe that invP ○π t = 1∣P ∣∑ϖ∈Pϖ
t ○π t = 1∣P ∣∑ϖ∈P(π ○ϖ)
t = invP , where
the last equality holds because P is a group. For the second identity, observe that π t ○ invP =
1
∣P ∣∑ϖ∈P π
t ○ϖ t = 1∣P ∣∑ϖ∈P(ϖ ○π)
t = invP , where the first equality follows form the linear
character of π t and the last equality holds because P is a group.
To prove (ii), observe that








invP = invP ,
where the first equality is due to the linearity of invP and the second due to (i).
To prove (iii), consider any u in kern(invP). Then invP u = 0 and therefore u = u−
invP u = 1∣P ∣∑π∈P(u−π
tu) is an element of IP . Conversely, consider any u in IP , then
u =∑nk=1 λk(vk −π tkvk) for some n in N, λk in R, vk in V and πk in P . But then invP u =
∑nk=1 λk(invP vk − invP(π tkvk)) = 0, where the first equality is due to the linearity of invP
and the last due to (i). Hence indeed u ∈ kern(invP).
To prove (iv), consider any u in rng(invP). Then u = invP v for some v in V, and therefore
π
tu = π t(invP v) = (π t ○ invP)v = invP v = u for all π in P , where the third equality follows
from (i). Hence indeed u ∈ VP . Conversely, consider any u in VP . Then π tu = u for all π in
P , and therefore u = invP u, whence indeed u ∈ rng(invP).
For the last statement, simply observe that v ∈ u/IP⇔ v−u ∈ IP⇔ invP(v−u) = 0⇔
invP v = invP u, where the second equivalence follows from (iii) and the last from the
linearity of invP . 
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